La falacia de la seguridad objetiva y sus consecuencias.

The determination that the main ground for citizens' security perception was not linked (directly and uniquely) with crime had, as a consequence, the definition of two kinds of security: the objective one, empirically demonstrable, truly existing, and the other one, the subjective, volatile und...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Guillén Lasierra, Francesc
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: 2020
Subjects:
Online Access:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7300478
Source:International e-journal of criminal sciences, ISSN 1988-7949, Nº. 15, 2020
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Summary: The determination that the main ground for citizens' security perception was not linked (directly and uniquely) with crime had, as a consequence, the definition of two kinds of security: the objective one, empirically demonstrable, truly existing, and the other one, the subjective, volatile und unreal, related to population's security perception. The later, although not necessarily based on crime, had to be taken into account because it influenced people's conducts. This article aims to evidence that the so called "objective security" depends on a lot of subjectivities from diverse actors, on which risks are considered acceptable, the ground goods considered to need protection, the circumstances that influence the main actors' decisions making procedures, the rules from assurance companies, resources in police stations, or the time coincidence of incidents that require police attention or response. That's to say: Objective security is also quite subjective. Nevertheless, the fact that security be mainly composed of subjective elements doesn't mean that the sources used to ascertain the traditional objective security (surveys and police statistics) are not relevant any more, or that the origin of insecurity is not important in order to design policies and strategies as response to it.