A refutação de Dworkin ao ceticismo quanto às pretensões juridicamente tuteladas
This article is a result of scientific research conducted about a theory belonging to the field of Philosophy of Law entitled Legal Pragmatism, specifically as to its main characteristics about the judicial acting from the perspective of the indoctrinator and US judge Richard Posner as well as the c...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| Published: |
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6071222 |
| Source: | Revista Electrónica Direito e Sociedade - REDES, ISSN 2318-8081, Vol. 5, Nº. 1, 2017132 pags. |
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| Summary: |
This article is a result of scientific research conducted about a theory belonging to the field of Philosophy of Law entitled Legal Pragmatism, specifically as to its main characteristics about the judicial acting from the perspective of the indoctrinator and US judge Richard Posner as well as the criticism made by the also philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin on some aspects of the thought of Posner, especially the aspect of skepticism as to pretensions juridically tutored. In addition, it presents the solution developed by Dworkin for what he believes are inconsistencies presents in the Legal Pragmatism of Posner, that would be the law as integrity. Analyzes of THE theoretical way the thought of these two authors, both appropriating some of his major works which focus on the judicial acting. Considers, lastly, that Dworkin does not ignore the Legal Pragmatism as a whole, having succeeded in extracting the best aspects of this theory in order to reach a solution that, in his view, would be more consistent and complete to legal practice. |
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