Normatividade semântica e a objetividade da argumentação jurídica

With regard to its importance, Jürgen Habermas compared Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit with A Theory of Justice. This paper investigates the significance of Brandom’s philosophy of meaning to legal interpretation. The focus of attention is whether the meaning of a norm can constrain legal inter...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Klatt, Matthias, Oliveira de Sousa, Felipe
Format: Article
Language:Portuguese
Published: 2010
Online Access:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5007528
Source:Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), ISSN 2175-2168, Vol. 2, Nº. 2, 2010 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Julho/Dezembro), pags. 201-213
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Summary: With regard to its importance, Jürgen Habermas compared Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit with A Theory of Justice. This paper investigates the significance of Brandom’s philosophy of meaning to legal interpretation. The focus of attention is whether the meaning of a norm can constrain legal interpretation. The questions of the determinacy and the objectivity of law are at issue. Both debates are dealt with by arguments from the philosophy of meaning. Because of the open texture of law and because of the vagueness of language, which is one of the burdens of judgment, judges have discretion in the application of law. The topic here is, whether and to what extent the meaning of the norm can serve to reduce this discretion. Both the legitimacy and the objectivity of judicial decisions depend on this. Key words: semantic normativity, objectivity, legal argumentation, norm, meaning.