Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública

In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard...

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Main Author: Moreso, Josep Joan
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: 2023
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Online Access:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8990913
Source:Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 55, 2023 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Edición Especial), pags. 15-31
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00016064452023-06-24Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón públicaMoreso, Josep JoanCristina LafontJohn Rawlspublic reasoncompletenessthe fact of pluralismCristina LafontJohn Rawlsrazón públicacompletitudel hecho del pluralismoIn this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.2023text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8990913(Revista) ISSN 0122-9893Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 55, 2023 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Edición Especial), pags. 15-31spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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source
Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 55, 2023 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Edición Especial), pags. 15-31
language
Spanish
topic
Cristina Lafont
John Rawls
public reason
completeness
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont
John Rawls
razón pública
completitud
el hecho del pluralismo
spellingShingle
Cristina Lafont
John Rawls
public reason
completeness
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont
John Rawls
razón pública
completitud
el hecho del pluralismo
Moreso, Josep Joan
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
description
In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.
format
Article
author
Moreso, Josep Joan
author_facet
Moreso, Josep Joan
author_sort
Moreso, Josep Joan
title
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_short
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_fullStr
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full_unstemmed
Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_sort
cristina lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
publishDate
2023
url
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8990913
_version_
1770000647751467008