The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law

The present paper examines Leon Petrazycki’s realistic theory of law and John Finnis’ natural law-driven criticisms on the concept of legal emotions. At the beginning of the 20th century Leon Petrazycki developed psychological theory of law. Petrazycki’s theory had a substantial influence on the for...

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Main Author: Stanek, Julia
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2022
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Online Access:https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8949025
Source:Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 17, Nº. 35, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Julio-Diciembre), pags. 495-522
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Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 17, Nº. 35, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Julio-Diciembre), pags. 495-522
language
English
topic
emoções jurídicas
teoria psicológica do direito
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
emociones jurídicas
teoría psicológica del derecho
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
legal emotions
psychological theory of law
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
spellingShingle
emoções jurídicas
teoria psicológica do direito
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
emociones jurídicas
teoría psicológica del derecho
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
legal emotions
psychological theory of law
John Finnis
Leon Petrażycki
Stanek, Julia
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
description
The present paper examines Leon Petrazycki’s realistic theory of law and John Finnis’ natural law-driven criticisms on the concept of legal emotions. At the beginning of the 20th century Leon Petrazycki developed psychological theory of law. Petrazycki’s theory had a substantial influence on the formation of original, apart from the American and Scandinavian legal realism, version of legal realism. Petrazycki’s theory is based on his concept of legal emotions which he regarded as belonging to the wider class of ethical emotions. Initially, the author analyses Petrazycki’s and his followers approach, which centers around the idea that legal emotions are both mystic and authoritative and to some extent they are perceived as internal restrictions of our freedom. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the authoritative nature of legal emotions. The author offers an interpretation of the authoritativeness of legal emotions within legal realism. The author postulates that this term should be interpreted as resulting from mental processes associated with experiencing emotions, i.a.(inter alia) intuitive reasoning. In the second part, the author analyses the approach proposed by John Finnis, who holds that legal emotions have the authoritativeness of truth. In the final section, the author discusses the most recent research in the field of legal philosophy, including results of cognitive neuroscience relevant to emotions and intuitive reasoning.
format
Article
author
Stanek, Julia
author_facet
Stanek, Julia
author_sort
Stanek, Julia
title
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
title_short
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
title_full
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
title_fullStr
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
title_full_unstemmed
The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
title_sort
authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? leon petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
publishDate
2022
url
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8949025
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00016002052023-05-25The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural lawStanek, Juliaemoções jurídicasteoria psicológica do direitoJohn FinnisLeon Petrażyckiemociones jurídicasteoría psicológica del derechoJohn FinnisLeon Petrażyckilegal emotionspsychological theory of lawJohn FinnisLeon PetrażyckiThe present paper examines Leon Petrazycki’s realistic theory of law and John Finnis’ natural law-driven criticisms on the concept of legal emotions. At the beginning of the 20th century Leon Petrazycki developed psychological theory of law. Petrazycki’s theory had a substantial influence on the formation of original, apart from the American and Scandinavian legal realism, version of legal realism. Petrazycki’s theory is based on his concept of legal emotions which he regarded as belonging to the wider class of ethical emotions. Initially, the author analyses Petrazycki’s and his followers approach, which centers around the idea that legal emotions are both mystic and authoritative and to some extent they are perceived as internal restrictions of our freedom. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the authoritative nature of legal emotions. The author offers an interpretation of the authoritativeness of legal emotions within legal realism. The author postulates that this term should be interpreted as resulting from mental processes associated with experiencing emotions, i.a.(inter alia) intuitive reasoning. In the second part, the author analyses the approach proposed by John Finnis, who holds that legal emotions have the authoritativeness of truth. In the final section, the author discusses the most recent research in the field of legal philosophy, including results of cognitive neuroscience relevant to emotions and intuitive reasoning.A teoria realista do direito de Leon Petrazycki e a crítica do direito natural de John Finnis ao conceito de emoções jurídicas são examinadas. No início do século 20, Leon Petrazycki desenvolveu a teoria psicológica do direito. A teoria de Petrazycki teve uma influência substancial na formação da versão original do realismo jurídico, além do realismo jurídico americano e escandinavo. A teoria de Petrazycki é baseada em seu conceito de emoções legais, que ele considerava pertencer a uma classe maior de emoções éticas. Inicialmente, analisa-se a abordagem de Petrazycki e seus seguidores, que se concentra na ideia de que as emoções jurídicas são ao mesmo tempo místicas e autoritárias e, em certa medida, percebidas como restrições internas à nossa liberdade. Atenção especial é dada à análise da natureza autoritária das emoções jurídicas. O autor oferece uma interpretação da autoridade das emoções jurídicas dentro do realismo jurídico. O autor postula que este termo deve ser interpretado como resultado de processos mentais associados à vivência de emoções, i.a. (inter alia) raciocínio intuitivo. Na segunda parte, o autor analisa a abordagem proposta por John Finnis, que sustenta que as emoções jurídicas têm a autoridade da verdade. Na seção final, o autor revisa as pesquisas mais recentes no campo da filosofia jurídica, incluindo os achados da neurociência cognitiva relacionados às emoções e ao raciocínio intuitivo.  Se examina la teoría realista del derecho de Leon Petrazycki y las críticas iusnaturalistas de John Finnis al concepto de emociones jurídicas. A principios del siglo XX, Leon Petrazycki desarrolló la teoría psicológica del derecho. La teoría de Petrazycki tuvo una influencia sustancial en la formación de la versión original del realismo jurídico, aparte del realismo jurídico estadounidense y escandinavo. La teoría de Petrazycki se basa en su concepto de emociones jurídicas, que consideraba pertenecientes a una clase más amplia de emociones éticas. Inicialmente, se analiza el enfoque de Petrazycki y sus seguidores, que se centra en la idea de que las emociones jurídicas son a la vez místicas y autoritarias y, en cierta medida, se perciben como restricciones internas de nuestra libertad. Se presta especial atención al análisis del carácter autoritativo de las emociones jurídicas. El autor ofrece una interpretación de la autoridad de las emociones jurídicas dentro del realismo jurídico. El autor postula que este término debe interpretarse como resultado de procesos mentales asociados con experimentar emociones, i.a. (inter alia)  razonamiento intuitivo. En la segunda parte, el autor analiza el enfoque propuesto por John Finnis, quien sostiene que las emociones jurídicas tienen la autoridad de la verdad. En la sección final, el autor analiza las investigaciones más recientes en el campo de la filosofía jurídica, incluidos los resultados de la neurociencia cognitiva relacionados con las emociones y el razonamiento intuitivo.2022text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8949025(Revista) ISSN 1794-6638Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 17, Nº. 35, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Julio-Diciembre), pags. 495-522engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. 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