The authority of legal emotions: mysticism or truth? Leon Petrazycki’s legal realism vs. natural law
The present paper examines Leon Petrazycki’s realistic theory of law and John Finnis’ natural law-driven criticisms on the concept of legal emotions. At the beginning of the 20th century Leon Petrazycki developed psychological theory of law. Petrazycki’s theory had a substantial influence on the for...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8949025 |
| Fuente: | Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 17, Nº. 35, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Julio-Diciembre), pags. 495-522 |
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| Sumario: |
The present paper examines Leon Petrazycki’s realistic theory of law and John Finnis’ natural law-driven criticisms on the concept of legal emotions. At the beginning of the 20th century Leon Petrazycki developed psychological theory of law. Petrazycki’s theory had a substantial influence on the formation of original, apart from the American and Scandinavian legal realism, version of legal realism. Petrazycki’s theory is based on his concept of legal emotions which he regarded as belonging to the wider class of ethical emotions. Initially, the author analyses Petrazycki’s and his followers approach, which centers around the idea that legal emotions are both mystic and authoritative and to some extent they are perceived as internal restrictions of our freedom. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the authoritative nature of legal emotions. The author offers an interpretation of the authoritativeness of legal emotions within legal realism. The author postulates that this term should be interpreted as resulting from mental processes associated with experiencing emotions, i.a.(inter alia) intuitive reasoning. In the second part, the author analyses the approach proposed by John Finnis, who holds that legal emotions have the authoritativeness of truth. In the final section, the author discusses the most recent research in the field of legal philosophy, including results of cognitive neuroscience relevant to emotions and intuitive reasoning. |
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