Reformas (in)constitucionales basadas en acuerdos de paz
Peace agreements aiming to end intra-state armed conflicts have often provided for radical constitutional change, with more than 100 peace agreements concluded since 1989 containing provisions on constitutional reform. When such constitutional change is envisaged to take place within the framework o...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Published: |
2022
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8550235 |
| Source: | Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 53, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Septiembre-Diciembre), pags. 5-53 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
| Summary: |
Peace agreements aiming to end intra-state armed conflicts have often provided for radical constitutional change, with more than 100 peace agreements concluded since 1989 containing provisions on constitutional reform. When such constitutional change is envisaged to take place within the framework of an existing constitution, as opposed to the making of a new constitution, hard-achieved deals between peace-making parties are exposed to ‘the unconstitutionality challenge’. Although there is ample literature on the making of a new constitution during transitions from conflict to peace, implementing a peace agreement within an existing constitutional framework and ‘the unconstitutionality challenge’ to peace reforms have not been fully examined to date. In this Article, we first identify the modalities in which ‘the unconstitutionality challenge’ is directed at constitutional change rooted in peace agreements. We do so through a comparative survey and by reference to peace processes in Colombia (with the farc-ep) and the Philippines (regarding the Mindanao conflict). We then examine the promise and limitations of three legal strategies in addressing the unconstitutionality challenge: (i) recourse to international law in assessing unconstitutionality, (ii) transitionalism in judicial review, and (iii) attributing supraconstitutional or international legal status to peace agreements. We conclude that while each strategy has some merit, their effectiveness may be limited where they lack legal feasibility or political purchase. The resulting intractability of the unconstitutionality challenge, particularly in jurisdictions where there is a strong commitment to legalism, warrants a rethinking of the link between peace-making and constitutional reform and the importance of taking existing constitutional frameworks in transitional countries seriously. |
|---|