La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
Many courts around the world have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment. But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states. It is imp...
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2022
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| Source: | Díkaion: revista de actualidad jurídica, ISSN 0120-8942, Vol. 31, Nº. 1, 2022, pags. 5-49 |
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Díkaion: revista de actualidad jurídica, ISSN 0120-8942, Vol. 31, Nº. 1, 2022, pags. 5-49
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Spanish
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Unconstitutional constitutional amendment
constitutional review formalism France Georgia Turkey Reforma constitucional inconstitucional revisión constitucional formalismo Francia Georgia Turquía Reforma constitucional inconstitucional revisão constitucional formalismo França Geórgia Turquia |
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Unconstitutional constitutional amendment
constitutional review formalism France Georgia Turkey Reforma constitucional inconstitucional revisión constitucional formalismo Francia Georgia Turquía Reforma constitucional inconstitucional revisão constitucional formalismo França Geórgia Turquia Albert, Richard Nakashidze, Malkhaz Olcay, Tarik La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales |
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Many courts around the world have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment. But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states. It is imperative that constitutional actors know that there is another answer to the question whether an amendment can be unconstitutional. We have three purposes in this Article, and we seek to fulfill each of them with reference to three jurisdictions in particular—France, Georgia, and Turkey—whose constitutions and attendant constitutional practices have expressly rejected the doctrine in a way that reflects what we describe as their shared formalist resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments. We seek first to demonstrate that the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment has not yet matured into a global norm of constitutionalism. We seek also to explain how a jurisdiction that expressly rejects the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment operates in the face of an amendment that would otherwise be invalidated as unconstitutional in a jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine. We finally seek to evaluate what is gained and lost in a constitutional state by rejecting the doctrine. We find that there are both democracy-enhancing and democracy-weakening consequences that follow from the choice to reject the doctrine outright. Our larger purpose—to diversify our thinking about what risks becoming seen as a necessary feature of constitutionalism but that design and practice show plainly is not—is inherent in the project itself.
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| format |
Article
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| author |
Albert, Richard
Nakashidze, Malkhaz Olcay, Tarik |
| author_facet |
Albert, Richard
Nakashidze, Malkhaz Olcay, Tarik |
| author_sort |
Albert, Richard
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| title |
La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| title_short |
La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| title_full |
La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| title_fullStr |
La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| title_full_unstemmed |
La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| title_sort |
la resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales
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| publishDate |
2022
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8533147
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1741439945890856960
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00015416662022-08-12La resistencia formalista a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionalesAlbert, RichardNakashidze, MalkhazOlcay, TarikUnconstitutional constitutional amendmentconstitutional reviewformalismFranceGeorgiaTurkeyReforma constitucional inconstitucionalrevisión constitucionalformalismoFranciaGeorgiaTurquíaReforma constitucional inconstitucionalrevisão constitucionalformalismoFrançaGeórgiaTurquiaMany courts around the world have either asserted or exercised the power to invalidate a constitutional amendment. But we should not take the increasing prevalence of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment as evidence of its appropriateness for all constitutional states. It is imperative that constitutional actors know that there is another answer to the question whether an amendment can be unconstitutional. We have three purposes in this Article, and we seek to fulfill each of them with reference to three jurisdictions in particular—France, Georgia, and Turkey—whose constitutions and attendant constitutional practices have expressly rejected the doctrine in a way that reflects what we describe as their shared formalist resistance to unconstitutional constitutional amendments. We seek first to demonstrate that the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendment has not yet matured into a global norm of constitutionalism. We seek also to explain how a jurisdiction that expressly rejects the idea of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment operates in the face of an amendment that would otherwise be invalidated as unconstitutional in a jurisdiction that has adopted the doctrine. We finally seek to evaluate what is gained and lost in a constitutional state by rejecting the doctrine. We find that there are both democracy-enhancing and democracy-weakening consequences that follow from the choice to reject the doctrine outright. Our larger purpose—to diversify our thinking about what risks becoming seen as a necessary feature of constitutionalism but that design and practice show plainly is not—is inherent in the project itself.Inúmeras cortes em todo o mundo vêm avaliando ou exercendo a faculdade para desvalidar uma reforma constitucional. Contudo, não devemos tomar a crescente prevalência da teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional como evidência de sua conveniência para todos os Estados constitucionais. É imperativo que os atores constitucionais compreendam que há outra resposta à pergunta sobre se uma reforma pode ser inconstitucional. Este artigo tem três objetivos e tratamos de cumprir cada um deles com referência a três jurisdições específicas: França, Geórgia e Turquia, cujas constituições e práticas constitucionais concomitantes rejeitam expressamente essa teoria de uma maneira que reflete o que descrevemos como resistência formalista comum às reformas constitucionais inconstitucionais. Em primeiro lugar, pretendemos demonstrar que a teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional ainda não amadureceu suficientemente para se tornar uma norma de constitucionalismo global. Além disso, buscamos explicar como uma jurisdição que rejeita expressamente a ideia de uma reforma constitucional inconstitucional opera diante de uma reforma que, em outras circunstâncias, seria invalidada por ser inconstitucional numa jurisdição onde sim a teoria fosse aceita. Por último, pretendemos avaliar o que se ganha e o que se perde num Estado constitucional quando essa teoria é rejeitada. Constata-se que a decisão de rejeitar essa teoria tem consequências tanto de fortalecimento quanto de enfraquecimento para a democracia. Nosso objetivo maior é inerente a nossa pesquisa em si: diversificar nosso pensamento sobre o risco que se corre ao considerar aceitar a teoria da reforma constitucional inconstitucional como uma característica necessária do constitucionalismo, quando o desenho e a prática constitucional mostram claramente o contrário.Numerosas cortes en todo el mundo han evaluado o ejercido la facultad para invalidar una reforma constitucional. Sin embargo, no debemos tomar la creciente prevalencia de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como evidencia de su conveniencia para todos los Estados constitucionales. Es imperativo que los actores constitucionales comprendan que hay otra respuesta a la pregunta sobre si una reforma puede ser inconstitucional. Este artículo tiene tres objetivos y tratamos de cumplir cada uno de ellos con referencia a tres jurisdicciones específicas, Francia, Georgia y Turquía, cuyas constituciones y prácticas constitucionales concomitantes han rechazado expresamente esta teoría de una manera que refleja lo que describimos como una resistencia formalista común a las reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales. En primer lugar, pretendemos demostrar que la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional aún no ha madurado lo suficiente como para convertirse en una norma de constitucionalismo global. También procuramos explicar cómo opera una jurisdicción que rechaza expresamente la idea de una reforma constitucional inconstitucional frente a una reforma que, en otras circunstancias, sería invalidada por ser inconstitucional en una jurisdicción donde sí fuese aceptada la teoría. Por último, buscamos evaluar lo que se gana y lo que se pierde en un Estado constitucional cuando se rechaza esta teoría. Uno de los hallazgos es que la decisión de rechazar esta teoría tiene consecuencias tanto de fortalecimiento como de debilitamiento para la democracia. Nuestro propósito más amplio es inherente a nuestra investigación en sí misma: diversificar nuestro pensamiento sobre el riesgo que se corre al considerar la aceptación de la teoría de la reforma constitucional inconstitucional como una característica necesaria del constitucionalismo, cuando el diseño y la práctica constitucional muestran claramente lo contrario.2022text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8533147(Revista) ISSN 0120-8942Díkaion: revista de actualidad jurídica, ISSN 0120-8942, Vol. 31, Nº. 1, 2022, pags. 5-49spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. 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