Sin alternativa a la prisión: El periodo de seguridad y la finalidad resocializadora de la pena privativa de libertad
The constitutional declaration contained in art. 25.2, even when not configured as a subjective right subject to protection before the Constitutional Court, if interpreted in a less limited manner than the exclusive projection of penitentiary execution, serves to reject long-term custodial sentences...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=8231362 |
| Fuente: | Revista Internacional de Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, ISSN 2255-1824, Nº. 26 (Diciembre), 2021, pags. 133-174 |
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| Sumario: |
The constitutional declaration contained in art. 25.2, even when not configured as a subjective right subject to protection before the Constitutional Court, if interpreted in a less limited manner than the exclusive projection of penitentiary execution, serves to reject long-term custodial sentences and to discuss the relevance of the so-called “security period” which, introduced by the Organic Law 7/2003, obliges to fulfill, in certain cases in an imperative way, a part of the custodial sentence not susceptible to remission. This armored period in which part of the sentence must be irretrievably served in the penitentiary facility without being able to obtain the third degree of treatment positions itself as a strange element to the principle of flexibility inherent in the system of scientific individualization in use in our LOGP as it is based exclusively on the degree of severity of the sentence and the fulfillment of a certain period of time, which takes us back from the progressive system that was believed to have been overcome and brings us closer to the purposes of general prevention.
The attenuation of the rigor that the 2010 reform entailed, configuring the institute as optional and the possibility of returning to the ordinary regime, does not manage to avoid the dysfunctionality that is generated when the sentencing judge decides, apart from prison treatment, the adequacy of a figure that affects the execution, without specifying the criteria used to decide, nor avoiding the difficulties that the revocation process presents, in which the victim also actively intervenes. |
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