Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

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Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, ISSN 2359-5639, Vol. 7, Nº. 3, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: setembro/dezembro - Dossiê: "Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions - a dialogue with Richard Albert"), pags. 773-794

English

constitutional renewal
constitutional dismemberment
constitutional amendment
Richard Albert
natality
enovação constitucional
desmembra-mento constitucional
emenda constitucional
Richard Albert
natalidade

constitutional renewal
constitutional dismemberment
constitutional amendment
Richard Albert
natality
enovação constitucional
desmembra-mento constitucional
emenda constitucional
Richard Albert
natalidade
Kuo, Ming-Sung
Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

This paper aims to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismemberment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitutional dismemberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary constitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dismemberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, it is further observed that the constitution-making transmutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of constitutional changes into amendment, dismemberment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified constitution with constitutional natality dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual framework of constitutional change reflects the centrality of comparative written constitutions in the place of comparative constitutional phenomena in current comparative constitutional studies.

Article

Kuo, Ming-Sung

Kuo, Ming-Sung

Kuo, Ming-Sung

Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

disaggregating dismemberment: nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalism

2020

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7680820

1709752973203079168

dialnet-ar-18-ART00014236712020-12-17Disaggregating dismemberment: Nullity, natality, and the hollowing of constitutional renewal in designed written constitutionalismKuo, Ming-Sungconstitutional renewalconstitutional dismembermentconstitutional amendmentRichard Albertnatalityenovação constitucionaldesmembra-mento constitucionalemenda constitucionalRichard AlbertnatalidadeThis paper aims to rethink the idea of constitutional renewal through a dissection of Richard Albert’s ground-breaking concept of constitutional dismemberment. It is contended that under the rubric of constitutional dismemberment are two exceptional constitutional phenomena: the ought-to-be declared nullity of unconstitutional constitutional amendments and the legal unity-defying, extraconstitutional expression of what Hannah Arendt called “natality” in political action. The thesis is that attempts to tame revolutionary constitutional alteration with designed rules as to formal constitutional change as Albert’s illustrates are missing the meaning of constitution-making for a natality-driven constitutional renewal characteristically defies designed constitutional form. The concept of constitutional dismemberment is first dissected in light of Arendt’s idea of natality. With constitutional dismemberment unpacked, it is further observed that the constitution-making transmutes into the formal pronouncement of a new codified constitution in Albert’s rigid tripartite classification of constitutional changes into amendment, dismemberment, and enactment. Albert therefore inadvertently reduces constitution-making to the formal enactment of a new codified constitution with constitutional natality dismembered and constitutional renewal hollowed out. It is concluded that Albert’s formalistic conceptual framework of constitutional change reflects the centrality of comparative written constitutions in the place of comparative constitutional phenomena in current comparative constitutional studies.O objetivo deste trabalho é repensar a ideia de renovação constitucional através de uma análise do inovador concei-to de desmembramento constitucional de Richard Albert. Alega-se que, sob a rubrica do desmembramento constitu-cional, há dois fenômenos constitucionais excepcionais: a necessária declaração de nulidade de emendas constitucio-nais inconstitucionais e a extraconstitucional expressão do que Hannah Arendt chamou de “natalidade” em ação po-lítica. A tese é que tentativas de domar as alterações cons-titucionais revolucionárias através de regras desenhadas como mudanças formais à Constituição, como mostrado por Albert, carecem do significado de constitution-making para uma renovação constitucional guiada pela natalida-de, desafiando a forma do constitucionalismo desenhado. O conceito de desmembramento constitucional é primeiro analisado sob a luz da ideia de natalidade de Arendt. Após isso, na sequência observa-se que o constitution-making se transmuta em pronunciamentos formais de uma nova Constituição codificada na rígida classificação tripartida de Albert em emenda, desmembramento e promulgação. Al-bert, assim, inadvertidamente reduz o constitution-making à promulgação formal de uma nova Constituição codifica-da com natalidade constitucional desmembrada e reno-vação constitucional esvaziada. Conclui-se que o conceito formalista de Albert sobre mudança constitucional reflete a centralidade da comparação de constituições escritas no lugar da comparação de fenômenos constitucionais nos atuais estudos de direito comparado.2020text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7680820(Revista) ISSN 2359-5639Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, ISSN 2359-5639, Vol. 7, Nº. 3, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: setembro/dezembro - Dossiê: "Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions - a dialogue with Richard Albert"), pags. 773-794engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. 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