Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

dialnet-ar-18-ART0001423670

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Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, ISSN 2359-5639, Vol. 7, Nº. 3, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: setembro/dezembro - Dossiê: "Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions - a dialogue with Richard Albert"), pags. 733-753

English

teoria constitu-cional
desenho constitucional
teoria da escolha racional
Richard Alber
Direito Constitucional
constitutional amendments
constitutional theory
constitutional design
rational choice theory
Richard Albert
emendas constitucionais

teoria constitu-cional
desenho constitucional
teoria da escolha racional
Richard Alber
Direito Constitucional
constitutional amendments
constitutional theory
constitutional design
rational choice theory
Richard Albert
emendas constitucionais
Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden
Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

Richard Albert’s groundbreaking book Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions surely provides the most extensive analysis of constitutional amendments rules ever published. Particularly relevant is that, unlike part of the constitutional literature that overly stresses normative assumptions, Albert brings important insights about how constitutional amendment rules can influence certain outcomes and provide incentives for political players’ behaviors. By drawing from rational choice theory, this Article aims to show the value of self-enforcing constitutional amendment rules for constitutional design. Although Richard Albert does not directly work with rational choice language, he certainly knows how to operate some of its premises when examining cases, raising hypotheses, creating models, and suggesting constitutional frameworks. His book is a relevant example of how constitutional design, when not excessively dominated by normative assumptions that are taken for granted, can be the much-needed response to challenges that a strong reliance on those normative assumptions may fail to overcome.

Article

Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden

Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden

Benvindo, Juliano Zaiden

Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions

self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with richard albert’s constitutional amendments: making, breaking, and changing constitutions

2020

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7680819

1709752972852854784

dialnet-ar-18-ART00014236702020-12-17Self-enforcing constitutional amendments rules: a dialogue with Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing ConstitutionsBenvindo, Juliano Zaidenteoria constitu-cionaldesenho constitucionalteoria da escolha racionalRichard AlberDireito Constitucionalconstitutional amendmentsconstitutional theoryconstitutional designrational choice theoryRichard Albertemendas constitucionaisRichard Albert’s groundbreaking book Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions surely provides the most extensive analysis of constitutional amendments rules ever published. Particularly relevant is that, unlike part of the constitutional literature that overly stresses normative assumptions, Albert brings important insights about how constitutional amendment rules can influence certain outcomes and provide incentives for political players’ behaviors. By drawing from rational choice theory, this Article aims to show the value of self-enforcing constitutional amendment rules for constitutional design. Although Richard Albert does not directly work with rational choice language, he certainly knows how to operate some of its premises when examining cases, raising hypotheses, creating models, and suggesting constitutional frameworks. His book is a relevant example of how constitutional design, when not excessively dominated by normative assumptions that are taken for granted, can be the much-needed response to challenges that a strong reliance on those normative assumptions may fail to overcome.O livro inovador de Richard Albert, Constitutional Amend-ments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions com certeza fornece a análise mais extensiva das regras de emendas constitucionais já publicada. É particularmente relevante que, diferente de parte da literatura constitucio-nal que força suposições normativas, Albert traz importan-tes ideias sobre como as regras de emendas constitucionais podem influenciar certos resultados e fornecer incentivo para o comportamento de políticos. Partindo da teoria da escolha racional, este Artigo pretende mostrar o valor de regras auto-impositivas de emendas constitucionais para o desenho constitucional. Apesar de Richard Albert não trabalhar diretamente com linguagem de escolha racional, ele com certeza sabe operar algumas das suas premissa quando examina casos, levanta hipóteses, cria modelos, e sugere armações constitucionais. Seu livro é um exemplo relevante de como o desenho constitucional, quando não é excessivamente dominado por suposições normativas que são tomadas como certas, pode ser uma resposta necessá-ria para desafios que uma confiança forte naquelas suposi-ções normativas pode falhar em superar.2020text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7680819(Revista) ISSN 2359-5639Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, ISSN 2359-5639, Vol. 7, Nº. 3, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: setembro/dezembro - Dossiê: "Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions - a dialogue with Richard Albert"), pags. 733-753engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI