Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
The purpose of this article is to explore coalition formation in presidential systems using evidence from Latin America. It puts forward three hypotheses based on formateur power, electoral structures and party systems to explore when and why electoral and government coalition formation occurs. It u...
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2019
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| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7160509 |
| Source: | Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 186, 2019, pags. 171-199 |
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Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 186, 2019, pags. 171-199
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English
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Presidentialism
electoral systems party systems coalition formation Presidencialismo sistemas electorales sistemas de partido formación de coaliciones |
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Presidentialism
electoral systems party systems coalition formation Presidencialismo sistemas electorales sistemas de partido formación de coaliciones Bunker, Kenneth Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America |
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The purpose of this article is to explore coalition formation in presidential systems using evidence from Latin America. It puts forward three hypotheses based on formateur power, electoral structures and party systems to explore when and why electoral and government coalition formation occurs. It uses evidence stemming from eighteen democratic presidential regimes in Latin America from 1980 to 2010. It looks at 100 elections and 407 aggregate years of democratic government. It analyses data organized in a cross-sectional time-series fashion through a logit function with random effects and robust standard errors. It finds that in democracies with weak presidents, restrictive electoral rules and highly fragmented party systems, the president will seek the support of multiple parties. While the effective number of parties is the most important determinant, rules related to legislative elections are more important predictors of electoral coalitions, and those related to presidential elections are more important predictors of government coalitions. The findings in this article are important insofar as yielding critical insight into partisan strategies in both the run-up to elections and the maintenance of governments, as well as contributing to a general theory of coalition formation.
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Article
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Bunker, Kenneth
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Bunker, Kenneth
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Bunker, Kenneth
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| title |
Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
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| title_short |
Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
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| title_full |
Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
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Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
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Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin America
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why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: electoral and government coalition formation in latin america
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2019
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7160509
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1709753762197798912
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00014191662020-12-04Why do parties cooperate in presidentialism?: Electoral and government coalition formation in Latin AmericaBunker, KennethPresidentialismelectoral systemsparty systemscoalition formationPresidencialismosistemas electoralessistemas de partidoformación de coalicionesThe purpose of this article is to explore coalition formation in presidential systems using evidence from Latin America. It puts forward three hypotheses based on formateur power, electoral structures and party systems to explore when and why electoral and government coalition formation occurs. It uses evidence stemming from eighteen democratic presidential regimes in Latin America from 1980 to 2010. It looks at 100 elections and 407 aggregate years of democratic government. It analyses data organized in a cross-sectional time-series fashion through a logit function with random effects and robust standard errors. It finds that in democracies with weak presidents, restrictive electoral rules and highly fragmented party systems, the president will seek the support of multiple parties. While the effective number of parties is the most important determinant, rules related to legislative elections are more important predictors of electoral coalitions, and those related to presidential elections are more important predictors of government coalitions. The findings in this article are important insofar as yielding critical insight into partisan strategies in both the run-up to elections and the maintenance of governments, as well as contributing to a general theory of coalition formation.El propósito de este artículo es explorar la formación de coaliciones en sistemas presidenciales utilizando evidencia de América Latina. Presenta tres hipótesis basadas en el poder de los presidentes, las estructuras electorales y los sistemas de los partidos para explorar cuándo y por qué ocurre la formación de coaliciones electorales y de gobierno. Utiliza evidencia proveniente de dieciocho regímenes presidenciales democráticos entre 1980 y 2010. Examina cien elecciones y cuatrocientos siete años de gobierno democrático. Analiza los datos organizados en una serie temporal por medio de una función logística con efectos aleatorios. Encuentra que en democracias con presidentes débiles, reglas electorales restrictivas y sistemas de partidos altamente fragmentados, el presidente buscará el apoyo de múltiples partidos. Si bien el número efectivo de partidos es el determinante más importante, las reglas relacionadas con las elecciones legislativas son los predictores más importantes de las coaliciones electorales, y las relacionadas con las elecciones presidenciales son las más importantes de las gubernamentales. Los hallazgos en este artículo son importantes porque arrojan una visión crítica de las estrategias partidarias tanto en el periodo previo a las elecciones como durante el periodo de gobierno, y también porque contribuyen a la formulación de una teoría general de formación de coaliciones.2019text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7160509(Revista) ISSN 0048-7694Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 186, 2019, pags. 171-199engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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