Fumigaciones, incumplimientos, coaliciones y resistencias
This article aims to explain how the Colombian state addresses coca demands and mobilizations: negotiating and then defaulting --the noncompliance cycle. Despite how apparently counterproductive it is, the cycle is persistent and, perhaps the main form of the state's response to those mobilizat...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7576161 |
| Fuente: | Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, ISSN 0124-0579, Vol. 22, Nº. 2, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Economías ilícitas y movilización social) |
| Etiquetas: |
Añadir etiqueta
Sin etiquetas: Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro
|
| Sumario: |
This article aims to explain how the Colombian state addresses coca demands and mobilizations: negotiating and then defaulting --the noncompliance cycle. Despite how apparently counterproductive it is, the cycle is persistent and, perhaps the main form of the state's response to those mobilizations. I argue that part of the noncompliance cycle is due to the nature of the coalitions that support the drug war in Colombia. Furthermore, these coalitions, typically long, range from global to purely local, so they can charge peasants with prohibitive costs without being affected by the new policies. In addition, these have not always been smoothly articulated to the country's greater waged global war, the war against subversion. Both circumstances generate permanent blockages, instabilities, and problems of collective action. |
|---|