Determinantes de la cohesión en la votación del legislativo en las coaliciones oficialistas y de oposición en la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, 2006-2014
When institutional incentives are equal and cohesion in the legislative behaviour of political parties varies depending on which of them hold power, we can assume that Party culture affects the level of voting cohesion of its legislative delegation, whether in government or in opposition. Between 19...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
2019
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7063488 |
| Fuente: | Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 185, 2019, pags. 225-258 |
| Etiquetas: |
Añadir etiqueta
Sin etiquetas: Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro
|
| Sumario: |
When institutional incentives are equal and cohesion in the legislative behaviour of political parties varies depending on which of them hold power, we can assume that Party culture affects the level of voting cohesion of its legislative delegation, whether in government or in opposition. Between 1990 and 2010, the centre-left Concertación coalition controlled the presidency and (except for 2008-2009) the majority in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. Between 2010 and 2014, the centre-right Alianza and its allies controlled the presidency and the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. With data from 5,216 roll-call votes in the two legislative terms between 2006 and 2014, we analyse cohesion in the voting behavior of legislators in the government and opposition coalitions. We assess two hypotheses, finding that the governing coalition is more cohesive than the opposition and that both coalitions are more disciplined for roll call votes that are of greater importance. We also report that Concertación becomes more cohesive and Alianza less so toward the end of presidential terms. Under the same legislative rules, then, the left and right coalitions behave differently in terms of their voting cohesiveness. |
|---|