Libre circulación de los matrimonios del mismo sexo celebrados en el territorio de la Unión Europea: consecuencias del asunto "Coman y otros"
ECJ Ruling of 5 June 2018 in Coman and others case requires that all Member States recognise same-sex marriages for the purposes of EU free movement where that marriage involves an EU citizen and was legally conducted in one of EU Member States. When EU law stipulates that the enjoyment of freedom o...
Saved in:
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Published: |
2019
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6888194 |
Source: | Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, ISSN 1138-4026, Año nº 23, Nº 62, 2019, pags. 41-79 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
Summary: |
ECJ Ruling of 5 June 2018 in Coman and others case requires that all Member
States recognise same-sex marriages for the purposes of EU free movement where that
marriage involves an EU citizen and was legally conducted in one of EU Member
States. When EU law stipulates that the enjoyment of freedom of movement with a
family member is made conditional upon the existence of a legal relationship such
as marriage, and then forgets that certain Member States prevent same-sex couples
from marrying, the inevitable consequence is that same-sex couples cannot exercise
their right of free movement due to restrictions posed by the Member States through
their domestic family law rules. Mutual recognition of same-sex spouses as “spouses”
under Directive 2004/38 is crucial, not only to ensure the effective enjoyment by
Union citizens of their right to free movement, but also to prevent discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and to ensure respect for their family life. The connections
between free movement, which is an individual right directly derived from
the article 21 TFEU, and the general principle of equal treatment should be seen not
only as a central concern for the individuals affected, but also as a test for assessing
the extent to which the EU can affirm the supremacy of certain fundamental rights
that it claims to recognize. |
---|