El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
The long interim period of the Spanish Government in 2016 and the weakness of the Government finally installed, coupled with a highly fragmented Chamber of Deputies and the absence of a solid parliamentary majority, contributed to the emergence of a series of novel constitutional scenarios. The most...
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| Language: | Spanish |
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2019
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| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6874651 |
| Source: | Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 183, 2019, pags. 67-99 |
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Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 183, 2019, pags. 67-99
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Spanish
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Veto
presupuestos iniciativas Parlamento conflicto Veto budget initiatives Parliament conflict |
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Veto
presupuestos iniciativas Parlamento conflicto Veto budget initiatives Parliament conflict Delgado Ramos, David El veto presupuestario del Gobierno |
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The long interim period of the Spanish Government in 2016 and the weakness of the Government finally installed, coupled with a highly fragmented Chamber of Deputies and the absence of a solid parliamentary majority, contributed to the emergence of a series of novel constitutional scenarios. The most significant of these was the rupture of the traditionally cooperative relationship between the Government and the Parliament, as shown by the three conflicts of powers that were brought before the Constitutional Court. The first was filed by the Congress against a Government it considered could not, absent its investiture, be subjected to parliamentary control. Others were filed by the Government against the Congress for processing legislative initiatives that violated its exclusive competence ex Article 134.6 CE, to veto parliamentary initiatives with budgetary impact. In this article, we study this second conflict, by first analyzing the legal configuration of the law of budgets, before continuing with the meaning and nature of the budget veto, issues of constitutional jurisprudence and the reforms proposed. We do this in order to propose a reform of the veto consistent with how it was envisioned in the Constitution, as an instrument for the Government’s function of direction and policy orientation and not as discretionary brake at the disposal of the Parliament.
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| format |
Article
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| author |
Delgado Ramos, David
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| author_facet |
Delgado Ramos, David
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| author_sort |
Delgado Ramos, David
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| title |
El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
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| title_short |
El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
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| title_full |
El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
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| title_fullStr |
El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
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| title_full_unstemmed |
El veto presupuestario del Gobierno
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| title_sort |
el veto presupuestario del gobierno
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| publishDate |
2019
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6874651
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1767735770303430656
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00013698352023-06-02El veto presupuestario del GobiernoDelgado Ramos, DavidVetopresupuestosiniciativasParlamentoconflictoVetobudgetinitiativesParliamentconflictThe long interim period of the Spanish Government in 2016 and the weakness of the Government finally installed, coupled with a highly fragmented Chamber of Deputies and the absence of a solid parliamentary majority, contributed to the emergence of a series of novel constitutional scenarios. The most significant of these was the rupture of the traditionally cooperative relationship between the Government and the Parliament, as shown by the three conflicts of powers that were brought before the Constitutional Court. The first was filed by the Congress against a Government it considered could not, absent its investiture, be subjected to parliamentary control. Others were filed by the Government against the Congress for processing legislative initiatives that violated its exclusive competence ex Article 134.6 CE, to veto parliamentary initiatives with budgetary impact. In this article, we study this second conflict, by first analyzing the legal configuration of the law of budgets, before continuing with the meaning and nature of the budget veto, issues of constitutional jurisprudence and the reforms proposed. We do this in order to propose a reform of the veto consistent with how it was envisioned in the Constitution, as an instrument for the Government’s function of direction and policy orientation and not as discretionary brake at the disposal of the Parliament.La larga interinidad del Gobierno en prorrogatio durante el año 2016 y la debilidad del Gobierno finalmente investido, con un Congreso de los Diputados hiperfragmentado y con la ausencia de una sólida mayoría parlamentaria, han supuesto la aparición de una serie de escenarios constitucionales inéditos. Uno de ellos, el más significativo, ha sido la ruptura de las tradicionalmente cooperativas relaciones entre el Gobierno y el Parlamento, como se ha evidenciado con la interposición de tres conflictos de atribuciones ante el Tribunal Constitucional. El primero, interpuesto por el Congreso contra un Gobierno que consideraba que, carente de investidura, no podría ser sometido al control parlamentario. Y, el resto, interpuesto por el Gobierno frente al Congreso por la tramitación de iniciativas legislativas que vulneraban su competencia exclusiva ex art. 134.6 CE de vetar iniciativas parlamentarias de incidencia presupuestaria. En este trabajo, pretendemos estudiar la problemática planteada en el segundo conflicto, analizando en primer lugar la configuración jurídica de la Ley de Presupuestos, para posteriormente continuar con el sentido y naturaleza del veto presupuestario, la jurisprudencia constitucional y las propuestas de reforma. Todo ello, al objeto de proponer una reforma del veto que lo sitúe jurídicamente en el lugar que pretendió conferirle la Constitución como instrumento de la función de dirección y orientación política del Gobierno, y no como freno discrecional del Parlamento.2019text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6874651(Revista) ISSN 0048-7694Revista de estudios políticos, ISSN 0048-7694, Nº 183, 2019, pags. 67-99spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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