Hermenêutica constitucional no paradigma da Différence
This research aimed to establish a critical reflection about the problem of the commitment of the constitutional interpretation by the STF (Brazilian Supreme Court) with the traditional referents of the Law. Starting from a rereading of the Kelsenian problem of the indeterminacy of language, we want...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Portuguese |
| Published: |
2018
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7277430 |
| Source: | Espaço Jurídico: Journal of Law, ISSN 2179-7943, Vol. 19, Nº. 1, 2018 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Espaço Juridico Journal of Law [EJJL]), pags. 25-44 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
| Summary: |
This research aimed to establish a critical reflection about the problem of the commitment of the constitutional interpretation by the STF (Brazilian Supreme Court) with the traditional referents of the Law. Starting from a rereading of the Kelsenian problem of the indeterminacy of language, we want to present the problem of the referent to the discussion, that is, the problem of the discretionary choice not only of the semio-logical relation between meaning and significant, which is the problem of judicial decisionism, but the problem of the arbitrary choice of the sym-bolic system that constitutes the interpretative reference of the judicial decision in each case. Our hypothesis is that the manner of constitutional interpretation by STF is characterized by a seman-tic externalism typical of the Différence paradigm. In order to achieve these results, will be used as methodology the theoretical contributions of the new speculative realism by Quentin Meillassoux, in order to make explicit the co-relationism pres-ent in the Brazilian constitutional hermeneutics and present a new perspective of discussion on the problem of the legal referent. As a result, we find that the problem of constitutional hermeneutics can be understood not only as a problem of inde-termination by “open” language of constitutional principles, either as a problem of subjectivist inter-pretation by judges, but also as a problem inscribed in the power relations between legal institutions (judiciary, public defender, private advocacy and academy) for the occupation of the spaces of pro-duction of law meaning. |
|---|