Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
In this article, I submit that toleration (as an institutional response to pluralism) is functionally displaced by the exercise of judicial discretion. The linchpin for this is the relevance and limits of substantive reasoning involving a claim to correctness. First, after presenting a concept of to...
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2019
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| Source: | Nuevo derecho, ISSN 2011-4540, Vol. 15, Nº. 25 (Julio - Diciembre), 2019, pags. 88-109 |
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Nuevo derecho, ISSN 2011-4540, Vol. 15, Nº. 25 (Julio - Diciembre), 2019, pags. 88-109
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Derecho
Ciencias Jurídicas Filosofía del Derecho Filosofía Política pluralismo razonable tolerancia discrecionalidad única respuesta correcta razonabilidad - Reasonable pluralism toleration discretion one right answer reasonableness |
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Ciencias Jurídicas Filosofía del Derecho Filosofía Política pluralismo razonable tolerancia discrecionalidad única respuesta correcta razonabilidad - Reasonable pluralism toleration discretion one right answer reasonableness Encinas Duarte, Gabriel Alejandro Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial |
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In this article, I submit that toleration (as an institutional response to pluralism) is functionally displaced by the exercise of judicial discretion. The linchpin for this is the relevance and limits of substantive reasoning involving a claim to correctness. First, after presenting a concept of toleration, I recall arguments which point toward its insufficiency regarding the achievements of constitutionalism. This follows from toleration implying either a comprehensive social context or an antiuniversalist bias in the justification of human rights and public reasons. Then, I claim that this incompatibility in itself is no obstacle for social stability or the operation of constitutionalism. This is so, since we find a functional equivalence in the safeguard of rights in constitutional states. However, it is on account of the abstract character of human rights, as well as disagreements in public justifications, that we are compelled to recognize the necessity of a margin of discretion, which becomes especially salient in constitutional adjudication. Finally, I pose the question whether it is adequate for the constitutional judge to draw limits in a piecemeal fashion to reasonable pluralism. I pose that a key element for this emerges from the commitments entailed by the claim to correctness in judicial reasoning, either in a bivalent fashion or as a matter of degree through reasonableness.
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Article
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Encinas Duarte, Gabriel Alejandro
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Encinas Duarte, Gabriel Alejandro
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Encinas Duarte, Gabriel Alejandro
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| title |
Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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pluralismo razonable en el estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicial
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2019
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7216292
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00013616342020-02-01Pluralismo razonable en el Estado constitucional: de la tolerancia a la discrecionalidad judicialEncinas Duarte, Gabriel AlejandroDerechoCiencias JurídicasFilosofía del DerechoFilosofía Políticapluralismo razonabletoleranciadiscrecionalidadúnica respuesta correctarazonabilidad- Reasonable pluralismtolerationdiscretionone right answerreasonablenessIn this article, I submit that toleration (as an institutional response to pluralism) is functionally displaced by the exercise of judicial discretion. The linchpin for this is the relevance and limits of substantive reasoning involving a claim to correctness. First, after presenting a concept of toleration, I recall arguments which point toward its insufficiency regarding the achievements of constitutionalism. This follows from toleration implying either a comprehensive social context or an antiuniversalist bias in the justification of human rights and public reasons. Then, I claim that this incompatibility in itself is no obstacle for social stability or the operation of constitutionalism. This is so, since we find a functional equivalence in the safeguard of rights in constitutional states. However, it is on account of the abstract character of human rights, as well as disagreements in public justifications, that we are compelled to recognize the necessity of a margin of discretion, which becomes especially salient in constitutional adjudication. Finally, I pose the question whether it is adequate for the constitutional judge to draw limits in a piecemeal fashion to reasonable pluralism. I pose that a key element for this emerges from the commitments entailed by the claim to correctness in judicial reasoning, either in a bivalent fashion or as a matter of degree through reasonableness.En este artículo presento la tesis del desplazo funcional de la tolerancia (como respuesta institucional ante el pluralismo) por el ejercicio de la discrecionalidad en sede judicial. El eje central para ello yace en la relevancia y límites de la argumentación sustantiva y con pretensiones de corrección. Primero, tras exponer un concepto de tolerancia, recabo argumentos que indican que Esta deviene insuficiente ante los logros del constitucionalismo. Esto es así porque la tolerancia implica un contexto social comprehensivo, o bien, presupone un sesgo antiuniversalista en las razones públicas y en la fundamentación de los derechos humanos. Después, indico que esta incompatibilidad, por sí misma, no implica un obstáculo para la estabilidad social, o bien, la operación del constitucionalismo. La razón de ello es que en los Estados constitucionales encontramos como equivalente funcional a la garantía de los derechos. Ahora bien, es la abstracción de los derechos humanos, así como los desacuerdos en la justificación pública, los que nos obligan a reconocer un necesario margen de discrecionalidad, especialmente en sede judicial mediante el control de constitucionalidad. Así, por último, planteo la pregunta sobre la adecuación de que sea el juzgador constitucional quien trace límites en forma puntual al pluralismo razonable. Se postula que una clave para ello radica en los compromisos que implica la pretensión de corrección en la fundamentación judicial, ya sea en un sentido bivalente o de razonabilidad gradual.2019text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7216292(Revista) ISSN 2500-672X(Revista) ISSN 2011-4540Nuevo derecho, ISSN 2011-4540, Vol. 15, Nº. 25 (Julio - Diciembre), 2019, pags. 88-109spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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