El efecto de las cláusulas penales en las decisiones de incumplimiento. Un análisis bajo la economía conductual
This paper shows how behavioral economics and, particularly, empirical researches based on its theories allow the analysis of classic concepts of private law through new standpoints. Under this approach, this text presents a research explaining why civil law countries restrict the amount of penalty...
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Main Author: | |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Published: |
2019
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Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7013336 |
Source: | Revista de Derecho Privado, ISSN 0123-4366, Nº. 36 (Enero-Junio), 2019, pags. 59-92 |
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Summary: |
This paper shows how behavioral economics and, particularly, empirical researches based on its theories allow the analysis of classic concepts of private law through new standpoints. Under this approach, this text presents a research explaining why civil law countries restrict the amount of penalty clauses and low-amount penalties might incentivize breaches of contracts. This paper also proposes an experiment on penalty clauses and analyzes its results. As concluding remarks, the text briefly mentions other topics in private law whose analysis might also be enriched by behavioral economics. |
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