Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
I call Post-positivist Age the status of legal theory after the "Hart-Dworkin debate" in which positivism has lost the ambition that characterized it throughout history and that made it distinctive in its confrontation with Natural Law Theory: to give account of a specifically legal normat...
Saved in:
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Published: |
2019
|
Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6978907 |
Source: | Revista de Derecho: Publicación de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica de Uruguay, ISSN 1510-3714, Nº. 19, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista de Derecho), pags. 49-75 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
id |
dialnet-ar-18-ART0001328804
|
---|---|
record_format |
dialnet
|
institution |
Dialnet
|
collection |
Dialnet AR
|
source |
Revista de Derecho: Publicación de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica de Uruguay, ISSN 1510-3714, Nº. 19, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista de Derecho), pags. 49-75
|
language |
Spanish
|
description |
I call Post-positivist Age the status of legal theory after the "Hart-Dworkin debate" in which positivism has lost the ambition that characterized it throughout history and that made it distinctive in its confrontation with Natural Law Theory: to give account of a specifically legal normativity, compatible with the skepticism or the avoidant position about the existence of an objective morality. In the Post-positivist Age, associated with a growing constitutionalization process that encompasses the philosophy of law itself, there are multiple proposals aimed at giving account of legal regulations and compatible with the social thesis, which currently is the common minimum in which the contemporary positivisms converge. The purpose of this paper is: (I) to identify some requirements that, within the framework of the challenges of constitutionalism, the positivist arguments should fulfill; (II) present some positivist emphases, based on the moral relevance of the distinction "to be / should be" of the law: anti-formalism, self-restriction of interpreters and intentionality of interpretation, contingency of the social world.
|
format |
Article
|
author |
Marquisio Aguirre, Ricardo
|
spellingShingle |
Marquisio Aguirre, Ricardo
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista |
author_facet |
Marquisio Aguirre, Ricardo
|
author_sort |
Marquisio Aguirre, Ricardo
|
title |
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
title_short |
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
title_full |
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
title_fullStr |
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
title_full_unstemmed |
Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
title_sort |
argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivista
|
publishDate |
2019
|
url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6978907
|
_version_ |
1709750623405080576
|
spelling |
dialnet-ar-18-ART00013288042019-07-21Argumentos positivistas en la era post-positivistaMarquisio Aguirre, RicardoI call Post-positivist Age the status of legal theory after the "Hart-Dworkin debate" in which positivism has lost the ambition that characterized it throughout history and that made it distinctive in its confrontation with Natural Law Theory: to give account of a specifically legal normativity, compatible with the skepticism or the avoidant position about the existence of an objective morality. In the Post-positivist Age, associated with a growing constitutionalization process that encompasses the philosophy of law itself, there are multiple proposals aimed at giving account of legal regulations and compatible with the social thesis, which currently is the common minimum in which the contemporary positivisms converge. The purpose of this paper is: (I) to identify some requirements that, within the framework of the challenges of constitutionalism, the positivist arguments should fulfill; (II) present some positivist emphases, based on the moral relevance of the distinction "to be / should be" of the law: anti-formalism, self-restriction of interpreters and intentionality of interpretation, contingency of the social world.Eu chamo de era pós-positivista o status da teoria jurídica após o "debate de Hart-Dworkin", no qual o positivismo perdeu a ambição que o caracterizou ao longo da história e que o distinguiu em seu confronto com a lei natural: consideração de uma normatividade especificamente legal, compatível com o ceticismo ou com a posição de evitar a existência de uma moralidade objetiva. Na era pós-positivista, associada a um crescente processo de constitucionalização que engloba a própia filosofia do direito, existem múltiplas propostas voltadas para a contabilização de normas legais e compatíveis com a tese social, que hoje é o mínimo comum em que os positivismos contemporâneos. O objetivo deste trabalho é: (I) identificar alguns requisitos que, no quadro dos desafios do constitucionalismo, os argumentos positivistas devem cumprir; (II) apresentar algumas ênfases positivistas, baseadas na relevância moral da distinção "ser / dever ser" do direito: antiformalismo, autolimitação dos intérpretes e intencionalidade da interpretação, contingência do mundo social.Denomino era postpositivista al estado de la teoría jurídica posterior al “debate Hart-Dworkin” en el cual el positivismo ha perdido la ambición que lo caracterizara a lo largo de la historia y que lo hacía distintivo en su confrontación con el iusnaturalismo: dar cuenta de una normatividad específicamente jurídica, compatible con el escepticismo o la postura evitativa acerca de la existencia de una moral objetiva. En la era postpositivista, asociada a un proceso de constitucionalización que abarca a la propia filosofía del derecho, conviven múltiples propuestas orientadas a dar cuenta de la normatividad jurídica y compatibles con la tesis social, que hoy es el mínimo común en el que convergen los positivismos contemporáneos. El objeto de este trabajo es: (I) identificar algunos requisitos que, en el marco de los desafíos del constitucionalismo, deberían cumplir los argumentos positivistas; (II) presentar algunos énfasis positivistas, basados en la relevancia moral de la distinción “ser/deber ser” del derecho: antiformalismo, auto-restricción de los intérpretes e intencionalidad de la interpretación, contingencia del mundo social.2019text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6978907(Revista) ISSN 1510-3714Revista de Derecho: Publicación de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica de Uruguay, ISSN 1510-3714, Nº. 19, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista de Derecho), pags. 49-75spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
|