La nueva doctrina del TJUE sobre el contrato de interinidad en el empleo público
The present work focuses on analyzing the recent doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), originally built around the possible violation of the principle of non-discrimination in the matter of temporary employment contracts in the public sector. The ups and downs of the afore...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Published: |
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6959608 |
Source: | Temas laborales: Revista andaluza de trabajo y bienestar social, ISSN 0213-0750, Nº 146, 2019, pags. 69-94 |
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Summary: |
The present work focuses on analyzing the recent doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), originally built around the possible violation of the principle of non-discrimination
in the matter of temporary employment contracts in the public sector. The ups and downs of the aforementioned
jurisprudential doctrine more than justify the attention given to this topic. The analysis
lacks the fact that the Court asks - without prejudice to the fact that it then asks the domestic courts
to adopt a decision - for the complete reason that justifies the different compensation provided for
in permanent contracts and temporary interim contracts. In effect, the CJEU explores this reason
in an objective, formal and linear manner, appealing to the different purpose of one and the other
compensation, but declines to do so by assessing its utility in a proportional manner.
This paper calls on the Spanish legislator to act on temporary hiring because there are so many times
that the Court invokes the action of the national judge, that legal security demands an imminent
legislative action. Proof of this are the various judgments found in the different levels of Spanish
Courts of Justice.
“The Supreme Court’s final judgment of January 13, 2019, with a private vote, does not cancel
doubts as to whether the principles that enlighten European regulation are assumed by our High
Court.” |
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