Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

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dialnet-ar-18-ART00013223122019-07-21Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and ConsiderationsThier, Andreastimefuturetemporalityrisk(dis-)continuityThis essay addresses perceptions of time and temporality in legal rules and in legal knowledge under changing historical conditions. The first section treats the ongoing »temporal turn« in current debates (I). The second section discusses the notions of time in the 19th, 20th, and21st centuries (II): Since the late 19th century, the perception of time has undergone a fundamental change. Contrary to the Newtonian tradition, time is no longer perceived as a universal and objective entity. Instead, a process of subjectivization of time has emerged. As a consequence, concepts like the idea of »social time« or »multiple times« have been discussed in the humanities and social sciences. The following section deals with the relationship between law, legal knowledge, and temporality in general (III): Legal rules and legal knowledge can only be understood with reference to temporal modes as the distinction between past/present/future. In this regard, time constitutes a sensegiving dimension of law. As a consequence, legal rules and legal knowledge serve as media of contemporary cultural practices of time and temporality. In this regard, the relationship between law and time is subject to historical change. Particular elements of temporality in the European legal tradition are dealt with in the next section(IV). While continuity and discontinuity as well as notions of eternity all appear as historical constants, how history and its relation to law are grasped is subject to change. This seems all the more true when it comes to our understanding of future, whereas acceleration and its impact on legal normativity show elements of stronger historical continuity.2017text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6094033(Revista) ISSN 1619-4993Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History, ISSN 1619-4993, Nº 25, 2017, pags. 20-44engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI

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Rechtsgeschichte-Legal History, ISSN 1619-4993, Nº 25, 2017, pags. 20-44

English

time
future
temporality
risk
(dis-)continuity

time
future
temporality
risk
(dis-)continuity
Thier, Andreas
Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

This essay addresses perceptions of time and temporality in legal rules and in legal knowledge under changing historical conditions. The first section treats the ongoing »temporal turn« in current debates (I). The second section discusses the notions of time in the 19th, 20th, and21st centuries (II): Since the late 19th century, the perception of time has undergone a fundamental change. Contrary to the Newtonian tradition, time is no longer perceived as a universal and objective entity. Instead, a process of subjectivization of time has emerged. As a consequence, concepts like the idea of »social time« or »multiple times« have been discussed in the humanities and social sciences. The following section deals with the relationship between law, legal knowledge, and temporality in general (III): Legal rules and legal knowledge can only be understood with reference to temporal modes as the distinction between past/present/future. In this regard, time constitutes a sensegiving dimension of law. As a consequence, legal rules and legal knowledge serve as media of contemporary cultural practices of time and temporality. In this regard, the relationship between law and time is subject to historical change. Particular elements of temporality in the European legal tradition are dealt with in the next section(IV). While continuity and discontinuity as well as notions of eternity all appear as historical constants, how history and its relation to law are grasped is subject to change. This seems all the more true when it comes to our understanding of future, whereas acceleration and its impact on legal normativity show elements of stronger historical continuity.

Article

Thier, Andreas

Thier, Andreas

Thier, Andreas

Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

Time, Law, and Legal History: Some Observations and Considerations

time, law, and legal history: some observations and considerations

2017

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6094033

1709749322107584512