No es mi culpa, fue mi cerebro. ¿Es esta una afirmación válida para aplicar la inimputabilidad a individuos con trastornos de la personalidad y psicópatas?
In this paper we study both the criminal responsibility and the mental state as excuse for indivisuals with personality disorders and psychopaths, as well as the arguments offered by the neuroscience to deny a basic, central, main, nuclear stone of our modern criminal law, the idea of a free will. A...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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2016
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| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6254915 |
| Source: | Derecho Penal y Criminología, ISSN 2346-2108, Vol. 37, Nº. 103, 2016, pags. 81-107 |
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| Summary: |
In this paper we study both the criminal responsibility and the mental state as excuse for indivisuals with personality disorders and psychopaths, as well as the arguments offered by the neuroscience to deny a basic, central, main, nuclear stone of our modern criminal law, the idea of a free will. According to that idea, the human being is free to choose between the right and wrong (unlawful) behavior. For neuroscience we don’t have such a freedom that would be merely an illusion, a mirage. Our brain would have decided and ordered formerly our behavior. |
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