Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
ABSTRACT: I inquire about the existence and limits of a moral principle of non-interference with privacy, such that should be constitutionally sanctioned. I evaluate various alternatives of conceptualization and assessment of its ground: personal autonomy. Those who refuse its value will have defla...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Published: |
2017
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6228934 |
| Source: | Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 44, Nº. 2, 2017, pags. 495-518 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
| id |
dialnet-ar-18-ART0001241322
|
|---|---|
| record_format |
dialnet
|
| spelling |
dialnet-ar-18-ART00012413222018-01-20Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constituciónIosa, JuanAutonomía personallibertad negativaautonomía como no interferenciaperfeccionismoliberalismoPersonal autonomynegative libertyautonomy as noninterferenceperfectionismliberalismABSTRACT: I inquire about the existence and limits of a moral principle of non-interference with privacy, such that should be constitutionally sanctioned. I evaluate various alternatives of conceptualization and assessment of its ground: personal autonomy. Those who refuse its value will have deflationary conceptions of noninterference. But valuing it does not involve a single mode of conceiving it. I assess a broad formulation that is not committed to any conception. Then I present Frankfurt/Dworkin´s and Raz’s conceptions. For all of them I highlight the consequences that follow concerning the delimitation of the scope of negative freedom, offer a wording of the warranty consistent with each posture and contrast it with hard cases.RESUMEN: Inquiero sobre la existencia y límites de un principio moral de no interferencia con la vida privada, tal que requiera sanción constitucional. Evalúo diversas alternativas de conceptualización y valoración de su fundamento: la autonomía personal. Quienes nieguen su valor tendrán concepciones deflacionistas de la no interferencia. Pero valorarla no implica un único modo de concebirla. Evalúo una formulación amplia que no se compromete con ninguna concepción. Presento luego las de Frankfurt/Dworkin y Raz. Indico las consecuencias que de ellas se siguen respecto de la delimitación del ámbito de libertad negativa. Ofrezco una redacción de la garantía conforme con cada postura y la contrasto con casos problemáticos.2017text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6228934(Revista) ISSN 0716-0747Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 44, Nº. 2, 2017, pags. 495-518spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
|
| institution |
Dialnet
|
| collection |
Dialnet AR
|
| source |
Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 44, Nº. 2, 2017, pags. 495-518
|
| language |
Spanish
|
| topic |
Autonomía personal
libertad negativa autonomía como no interferencia perfeccionismo liberalismo Personal autonomy negative liberty autonomy as noninterference perfectionism liberalism |
| spellingShingle |
Autonomía personal
libertad negativa autonomía como no interferencia perfeccionismo liberalismo Personal autonomy negative liberty autonomy as noninterference perfectionism liberalism Iosa, Juan Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución |
| description |
ABSTRACT: I inquire about the existence and limits of a moral principle of non-interference with privacy, such that should be constitutionally sanctioned. I evaluate various alternatives of conceptualization and assessment of its ground: personal autonomy. Those who refuse its value will have deflationary conceptions of noninterference. But valuing it does not involve a single mode of conceiving it. I assess a broad formulation that is not committed to any conception. Then I present Frankfurt/Dworkin´s and Raz’s conceptions. For all of them I highlight the consequences that follow concerning the delimitation of the scope of negative freedom, offer a wording of the warranty consistent with each posture and contrast it with hard cases.
|
| format |
Article
|
| author |
Iosa, Juan
|
| author_facet |
Iosa, Juan
|
| author_sort |
Iosa, Juan
|
| title |
Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| title_short |
Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| title_full |
Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| title_fullStr |
Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| title_sort |
libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
|
| publishDate |
2017
|
| url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6228934
|
| _version_ |
1709746473010200576
|