Libertad negativa, autonomía personal y constitución
ABSTRACT: I inquire about the existence and limits of a moral principle of non-interference with privacy, such that should be constitutionally sanctioned. I evaluate various alternatives of conceptualization and assessment of its ground: personal autonomy. Those who refuse its value will have defla...
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6228934 |
| Fuente: | Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 44, Nº. 2, 2017, pags. 495-518 |
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| Sumario: |
ABSTRACT: I inquire about the existence and limits of a moral principle of non-interference with privacy, such that should be constitutionally sanctioned. I evaluate various alternatives of conceptualization and assessment of its ground: personal autonomy. Those who refuse its value will have deflationary conceptions of noninterference. But valuing it does not involve a single mode of conceiving it. I assess a broad formulation that is not committed to any conception. Then I present Frankfurt/Dworkin´s and Raz’s conceptions. For all of them I highlight the consequences that follow concerning the delimitation of the scope of negative freedom, offer a wording of the warranty consistent with each posture and contrast it with hard cases. |
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