Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
The present paper pursues two objectives. First, it tries to show that the way of conceiving the Principle of Innocence depends on the conception of moral obligation that is adopted. This linkage between both conceptions has not been explored in the specialized literature. The paper attempts to corr...
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2017
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| Source: | Ars Boni et Aequi, ISSN 0719-2568, Vol. 13, Nº. 1, 2017, pags. 159-187 |
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00012211592019-11-20Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moralSeleme, Hugo OmarproofpunishmenttruthpruebacastigoverdadThe present paper pursues two objectives. First, it tries to show that the way of conceiving the Principle of Innocence depends on the conception of moral obligation that is adopted. This linkage between both conceptions has not been explored in the specialized literature. The paper attempts to correct this de!cit. Secondly, and once the link between both conceptions is established, it is argued for a particular conception of moral obligation. Speci!cally, several reasons are offered in favor of the prospective variant. Finally, this leads to the conclusion that the correct conception of the Principle of Innocence is that correlated with the prospective conception of moral obligation.El presente trabajo intenta mostrar, en primer lugar,que el modo de concebir el principio de inocencia depende de laconcepción de obligación moral que se posea. Esta vinculaciónentre ambas concepciones –la de obligación y la del principio deinocencia– no ha sido explorada en la literatura especializada. Eltrabajo intenta corregir este déficit. En segundo lugar, y una vezestablecida la vinculación entre ambas concepciones, el trabajo seencarga de mostrar que el modo correcto de concebir la obligaciónmoral es uno de índole prospectivista. Esto permite extraer laconclusión de que la manera correcta de concebir el principio deinocencia es la correlacionada con dicha concepción de obligaciónmoral.2017text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6126292(Revista) ISSN 0718-2457(Revista) ISSN 0719-2568Ars Boni et Aequi, ISSN 0719-2568, Vol. 13, Nº. 1, 2017, pags. 159-187spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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Ars Boni et Aequi, ISSN 0719-2568, Vol. 13, Nº. 1, 2017, pags. 159-187
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punishment truth prueba castigo verdad |
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punishment truth prueba castigo verdad Seleme, Hugo Omar Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral |
| description |
The present paper pursues two objectives. First, it tries
to show that the way of conceiving the Principle of Innocence depends
on the conception of moral obligation that is adopted. This
linkage between both conceptions has not been explored in the
specialized literature. The paper attempts to correct this de!cit.
Secondly, and once the link between both conceptions is established,
it is argued for a particular conception of moral obligation.
Speci!cally, several reasons are offered in favor of the prospective
variant. Finally, this leads to the conclusion that the correct conception
of the Principle of Innocence is that correlated with the prospective
conception of moral obligation.
|
| format |
Article
|
| author |
Seleme, Hugo Omar
|
| author_facet |
Seleme, Hugo Omar
|
| author_sort |
Seleme, Hugo Omar
|
| title |
Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| title_short |
Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| title_full |
Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| title_fullStr |
Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
Presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| title_sort |
presunción de inocencia y concepciones de la obligación moral
|
| publishDate |
2017
|
| url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6126292
|
| _version_ |
1709746386667307008
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