La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
This article shows, in the first place, that the two main arguments that have been used to distinguish social rights from liberal rights are based on two different concepts of subjective right and, in second place, that the two main lines of argument through which the equalization of these two categ...
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2015
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| Source: | Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 42, Nº. 3, 2015, pags. 819-842 |
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00009717842016-06-28La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberalesArriagada Cáceres, María BeatrizDerechos socialesDerechos liberalesDerechos fundamentalesDerechos subjetivosSocial rightsLiberal rightsFundamental rightsSubjective rightsThis article shows, in the first place, that the two main arguments that have been used to distinguish social rights from liberal rights are based on two different concepts of subjective right and, in second place, that the two main lines of argument through which the equalization of these two categories of fundamental rights have been procured, are constructed from a critique of the two concepts of subjective right that serve as a basis for their distinction. That done, these lines of argument have been analyzed critically in order to show that, although they are able to reduce the gap between social and liberal rights, they are not able to fulfil the intended aimEste artículo muestra, en primer lugar, que los dos principales argumentos que se han utilizado para distinguir a los derechos sociales de los derechos liberales se sustentan en dos diferentes conceptos de derecho subjetivo y, en segundo lugar, que las dos principales líneas argumentales por cuyo intermedio se ha procurado la equiparación de estas dos categorías de derechos fundamentales se construyen a partir de una crítica a los dos conceptos de derecho subjetivo que sirven de base a su distinción. Hecho esto, se analizan críticamente estas líneas argumentales con el propósito de mostrar que aunque ellas logran reducir la distancia que separa a los derechos sociales de los derechos liberales, no consiguen el objetivo que se proponen.2015text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5502548(Revista) ISSN 0716-0747Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 42, Nº. 3, 2015, pags. 819-842spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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Revista chilena de derecho, ISSN 0716-0747, Vol. 42, Nº. 3, 2015, pags. 819-842
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| language |
Spanish
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| topic |
Derechos sociales
Derechos liberales Derechos fundamentales Derechos subjetivos Social rights Liberal rights Fundamental rights Subjective rights |
| spellingShingle |
Derechos sociales
Derechos liberales Derechos fundamentales Derechos subjetivos Social rights Liberal rights Fundamental rights Subjective rights Arriagada Cáceres, María Beatriz La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales |
| description |
This article shows, in the first place, that the two main arguments that have been used to distinguish social rights from liberal rights are based on two different concepts of subjective right and, in second place, that the two main lines of argument through which the equalization of these two categories of fundamental rights have been procured, are constructed from a critique of the two concepts of subjective right that serve as a basis for their distinction. That done, these lines of argument have been analyzed critically in order to show that, although they are able to reduce the gap between social and liberal rights, they are not able to fulfil the intended aim
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| format |
Article
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| author |
Arriagada Cáceres, María Beatriz
|
| author_facet |
Arriagada Cáceres, María Beatriz
|
| author_sort |
Arriagada Cáceres, María Beatriz
|
| title |
La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
|
| title_short |
La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
|
| title_full |
La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
|
| title_fullStr |
La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
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| title_full_unstemmed |
La imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
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| title_sort |
la imposibilidad de equiparar derechos sociales y liberales
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| publishDate |
2015
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| url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5502548
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| _version_ |
1709743839141429248
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