Clara non sunt interpretanda vs. omnia sunt interpretanda
The paper addresses a contemporary Polish debate on the limits and functions of juristic interpretation of law. After presenting the main theses and features of Jerzy Wróblewski’s clarificative theory of juristic interpretation and Maciej Zieliński’s derivational theory of juristic interpretation, t...
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| Formatua: | Artikulua |
| Hizkuntza: | Ingelesa |
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2015
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| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328969 |
| Baliabidea: | Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law) |
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The paper addresses a contemporary Polish debate on the limits and functions of juristic interpretation of law. After presenting the main theses and features of Jerzy Wróblewski’s clarificative theory of juristic interpretation and Maciej Zieliński’s derivational theory of juristic interpretation, the author critically discusses various arguments (epistemological, ethical, empirical, historical, and practical) used in the debate. Finally, a tentative solution of the controversy, based on the criticism of Zieliński’s conception of legal norm, is proposed. It is argued that his conception is utopian and not recommendable, due to unacceptable conceptual and practical consequences. |
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