A realistic view on law and legal cognition
The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e....
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328968 |
| Fuente: | Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law) |
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| Sumario: |
The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e. the norms actually applied (that is, used in deciding cases) in the past and predictably applied in the future by law-applying agencies. The third thesis is that legal science as a cognitive activity must not be confused with legal scholarship. Although legal scholars do engage in cognitive activities, their work mainly consists in non-cognitive activities such as interpretation and legal construction. | An earlier version of this statement was published in Revus (2013) 19 in Italian, French, and Croatian. |
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