A realistic view on law and legal cognition
The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e....
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2015
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| Source: | Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law) |
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00008969502019-02-24A realistic view on law and legal cognitionGuastini, Riccardolegal realisminterpretive scepticismontology of lawlegal scholarshiplegal scienceThe author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e. the norms actually applied (that is, used in deciding cases) in the past and predictably applied in the future by law-applying agencies. The third thesis is that legal science as a cognitive activity must not be confused with legal scholarship. Although legal scholars do engage in cognitive activities, their work mainly consists in non-cognitive activities such as interpretation and legal construction. | An earlier version of this statement was published in Revus (2013) 19 in Italian, French, and Croatian.2015text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328968(Revista) ISSN 1581-7652(Revista) ISSN 1855-7112Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law)engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law)
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English
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| topic |
legal realism
interpretive scepticism ontology of law legal scholarship legal science |
| spellingShingle |
legal realism
interpretive scepticism ontology of law legal scholarship legal science Guastini, Riccardo A realistic view on law and legal cognition |
| description |
The author outlines one form of analytical legal realism as the junction of three main theses. According to its first main thesis, interpretive sentences in legal discourse are ascriptive sentences with no cognitive function. According to the second thesis, the law is the set of norms in force, i.e. the norms actually applied (that is, used in deciding cases) in the past and predictably applied in the future by law-applying agencies. The third thesis is that legal science as a cognitive activity must not be confused with legal scholarship. Although legal scholars do engage in cognitive activities, their work mainly consists in non-cognitive activities such as interpretation and legal construction. | An earlier version of this statement was published in Revus (2013) 19 in Italian, French, and Croatian.
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| format |
Article
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| author |
Guastini, Riccardo
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| author_facet |
Guastini, Riccardo
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| author_sort |
Guastini, Riccardo
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| title |
A realistic view on law and legal cognition
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| title_short |
A realistic view on law and legal cognition
|
| title_full |
A realistic view on law and legal cognition
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| title_fullStr |
A realistic view on law and legal cognition
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| title_full_unstemmed |
A realistic view on law and legal cognition
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| title_sort |
realistic view on law and legal cognition
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| publishDate |
2015
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| url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328968
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| _version_ |
1709743081152053248
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