Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

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Anuario iberoamericano de justicia constitucional, ISSN 1138-4824, Nº. 19, 2015, pags. 129-167

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Cartas coloniales
Constitución antigua
Derecho fundamental
Dictum de Coke
Judicial review
Legislación colonial
Privy Council
Tribunales coloniales
Ancient constitution
Cokeʼs dictum
Colonial courts
Colonial legislation
Charters
Fundamental law
Judicial review
Privy Council

Cartas coloniales
Constitución antigua
Derecho fundamental
Dictum de Coke
Judicial review
Legislación colonial
Privy Council
Tribunales coloniales
Ancient constitution
Cokeʼs dictum
Colonial courts
Colonial legislation
Charters
Fundamental law
Judicial review
Privy Council
Fernández Segado, Francisco
Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

The first sketchs of the judicial review have to place in the colonial period. In this age, the Cokeʼs dictum in the Bonhamʼs case became the most important single source of the notion of judicial review. The introduction of the judicial review presupposed the idea of a fundamental law, that is, a superior law that the colonial laws had to respect. In the 18th century the colonists should find firm bases for his idea about the existence of a fundamental law in those impressive doctrinal constructions of the Enlightenment, the systematic treaties on natural and international law. The colonial Charters granted for the King were considered by courts binding for the legislatures and they were applied as a higher law. In the Giddings v. Brown case (1657), for the first time, the Cokeʼs dictum received practical application in the other side of the Atlantic. In the ruling of this case the Judge Symonds wrote «that where a law is repugnant to fundamental law, it is void». Likewise, the Privy Council, in the practice of its appealʼs jurisdiction in relation to colonial courts, carried out a judicial review of the colonial legislation. Its judicial annulment of the statutes has been compared to the function of judicial review. In fact, in the Winthrop v. Lechmere case (1727), the Privy Council declared that an Act of Connecticut, the Act for the Settlement of Intestates Estates (1699) was null and void because it was «contrary to the laws of England, in regard it makes lands of inheritance distributables as personal estates, and it is not warranted by the Charter of that Colony». In short, the colonial epoch, even long before of James Otis and the Writs of Assistance Case, offers us some examples of the application of the judicial review of legislation doctrine and, above all, it reveals us that a such doctrine was very well known and acknowledged in considerable sectors of the legal colonial world.

Article

Fernández Segado, Francisco

Fernández Segado, Francisco

Fernández Segado, Francisco

Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanas

2015

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5273634

1709742721681326080

dialnet-ar-18-ART00008733122019-07-19Un precedente remoto de la judicial review: el control judicial de la legislación de las colonias americanasFernández Segado, FranciscoCartas colonialesConstitución antiguaDerecho fundamentalDictum de CokeJudicial reviewLegislación colonialPrivy CouncilTribunales colonialesAncient constitutionCokeʼs dictumColonial courtsColonial legislationChartersFundamental lawJudicial reviewPrivy CouncilThe first sketchs of the judicial review have to place in the colonial period. In this age, the Cokeʼs dictum in the Bonhamʼs case became the most important single source of the notion of judicial review. The introduction of the judicial review presupposed the idea of a fundamental law, that is, a superior law that the colonial laws had to respect. In the 18th century the colonists should find firm bases for his idea about the existence of a fundamental law in those impressive doctrinal constructions of the Enlightenment, the systematic treaties on natural and international law. The colonial Charters granted for the King were considered by courts binding for the legislatures and they were applied as a higher law. In the Giddings v. Brown case (1657), for the first time, the Cokeʼs dictum received practical application in the other side of the Atlantic. In the ruling of this case the Judge Symonds wrote «that where a law is repugnant to fundamental law, it is void». Likewise, the Privy Council, in the practice of its appealʼs jurisdiction in relation to colonial courts, carried out a judicial review of the colonial legislation. Its judicial annulment of the statutes has been compared to the function of judicial review. In fact, in the Winthrop v. Lechmere case (1727), the Privy Council declared that an Act of Connecticut, the Act for the Settlement of Intestates Estates (1699) was null and void because it was «contrary to the laws of England, in regard it makes lands of inheritance distributables as personal estates, and it is not warranted by the Charter of that Colony». In short, the colonial epoch, even long before of James Otis and the Writs of Assistance Case, offers us some examples of the application of the judicial review of legislation doctrine and, above all, it reveals us that a such doctrine was very well known and acknowledged in considerable sectors of the legal colonial world.Los primeros esbozos de la judicial review en Norteamérica han de situarse en el período colonial. En esa etapa el dictum de Coke en el Bonhamʼs case se iba a convertir en la fuente más importante de la revisión judicial de la legislación. La introducción de la revisión judicial presuponía la idea de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental, esto es, un Derecho superior que los estatutos de las asambleas legislativas coloniales habían de respetar. En el siglo xviii los colonos iban a encontrar unos sólidos puntos de apoyo para su idea acerca de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental en esas impresionantes construcciones doctrinales de la Ilustración que son los tratados sistemáticos sobre el Derecho natural e internacional. Las Cartas coloniales, otorgadas por el Rey, se consideraron por los tribunales vinculantes respecto a las Legislaturas coloniales, aplicándose como Derecho superior. En el caso Giddings v. Brown (1657) el dictum de Coke recibió por primera vez aplicación práctica al otro lado del Atlántico. En la decisión de este caso el juez Symonds escribía «que donde una ley es contraria a un Derecho fundamental, es nula». También el Privy Council, en el ejercicio de su jurisdicción de apelación respecto de los tribunales coloniales, iba a llevar a cabo una revisión judicial de la legislación colonial. Su anulación judicial de los estatutos coloniales se ha equiparado a la revisión judicial de la legislación. De hecho, en el caso Winthrop v. Lechmere (1727), el Privy Council declaró la nulidad de una ley de Connecticut de 1699, la Ley para la solución de las propiedades intestadas, declarándola nula y sin valor a causa de que era «contraria a las leyes de Inglaterra en cuanto que convertía tierras heredadas en distribuibles como propiedades personales y esto no estaba autorizado por la Carta de la Colonia». En resumen, la etapa colonial, incluso bastante antes de James Otis y del Writs of Assistance Case, nos ofrece algunos ejemplos de aplicación de la doctrina de la revisión judicial de la legislación y, sobre todo, nos revela que tal doctrina era muy bien conocida y admitida en amplios sectores del mundo jurídico colonial.2015text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5273634(Revista) ISSN 1138-4824Anuario iberoamericano de justicia constitucional, ISSN 1138-4824, Nº. 19, 2015, pags. 129-167spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. 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