Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
Can elements of the «Constitution» be unconstitutional and what would be the legal consequences? Several courts have considered such hypotheses but few of them have nullified provisions pertaining to the formal constitution. Scholarly debates remain highly controversial and convincing explanat...
Saved in:
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Published: |
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4560794 |
Source: | Revista española de derecho constitucional, ISSN 0211-5743, Año nº 33, Nº 99, 2013, pags. 17-60 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
id |
dialnet-ar-18-ART0000752150
|
---|---|
record_format |
dialnet
|
institution |
Dialnet
|
collection |
Dialnet AR
|
source |
Revista española de derecho constitucional, ISSN 0211-5743, Año nº 33, Nº 99, 2013, pags. 17-60
|
language |
Spanish
|
topic |
Reforma de la Constitución
normas constitucionales inconstitucionales sistema normativo supremacía de la Constitución nulidad interpretación constitucional Constitutional reform unconstitutional constitutional rules regulatory system supremacy of the constitution nullity Constitutional interpretation |
spellingShingle |
Reforma de la Constitución
normas constitucionales inconstitucionales sistema normativo supremacía de la Constitución nulidad interpretación constitucional Constitutional reform unconstitutional constitutional rules regulatory system supremacy of the constitution nullity Constitutional interpretation Pfersmann, Otto Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista |
description |
Can elements of the «Constitution» be unconstitutional and what would be the legal
consequences? Several courts have considered such hypotheses but few of them
have nullified provisions pertaining to the formal constitution. Scholarly debates remain
highly controversial and convincing explanations for one or another solution seem to be
wanting. This paper addresses the puzzle from both the point of view of legal theory and
at the level of comparative constitutional law in the perspective of analytic normativism.
It makes the claim that this approach allows to better analyse the underlying question as
a problem of complex hierarchies, which can provide solutions to cases in legal orders
as different as Austria, France, Germany or Israel. Traditionally, the constitution is seen
as one bloc on top of the legal system. But what this means remains often mysterious or
unclear. If there could be something above this highest element, it could be considered
from a moral perspective or in line with legal realism, a mere question of case-law.
According to the conception set forth here, whether different levels of legal norms
exist and what normative relations apply between them, is a question of positive law.
Hence there may be several layers above what is usually considered primary legislation,
if there are several legal forms, differentiated by their mode of production. The truly
difficult problem, then, is to find out whether these difference are related to organized
derogatory superiority, such that lower deficient norms can be nullified. Such structures
appear more and more frequently in contemporary law. To better grasp this, we use the
concept of non-equivalent polymorphism. The problem of whether courts are competent
to annul lower level constitutional provisions is presently not explicitly settled in formal
constitutions. It can �and should� nonetheless be solved through means of constitutional
interpretation
|
format |
Article
|
author |
Pfersmann, Otto
|
author_facet |
Pfersmann, Otto
|
author_sort |
Pfersmann, Otto
|
title |
Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
title_short |
Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
title_full |
Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
title_fullStr |
Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
title_full_unstemmed |
Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
title_sort |
reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativista
|
publisher |
Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales
|
publishDate |
2013
|
url |
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4560794
|
_version_ |
1709714982611976192
|
spelling |
dialnet-ar-18-ART00007521502016-04-13Reformas constitucionales inconstitucionales: una perspectiva normativistaPfersmann, OttoReforma de la Constituciónnormas constitucionales inconstitucionalessistema normativosupremacía de la Constituciónnulidadinterpretación constitucionalConstitutional reformunconstitutional constitutional rulesregulatory systemsupremacy of the constitutionnullityConstitutional interpretationCan elements of the «Constitution» be unconstitutional and what would be the legal consequences? Several courts have considered such hypotheses but few of them have nullified provisions pertaining to the formal constitution. Scholarly debates remain highly controversial and convincing explanations for one or another solution seem to be wanting. This paper addresses the puzzle from both the point of view of legal theory and at the level of comparative constitutional law in the perspective of analytic normativism. It makes the claim that this approach allows to better analyse the underlying question as a problem of complex hierarchies, which can provide solutions to cases in legal orders as different as Austria, France, Germany or Israel. Traditionally, the constitution is seen as one bloc on top of the legal system. But what this means remains often mysterious or unclear. If there could be something above this highest element, it could be considered from a moral perspective or in line with legal realism, a mere question of case-law. According to the conception set forth here, whether different levels of legal norms exist and what normative relations apply between them, is a question of positive law. Hence there may be several layers above what is usually considered primary legislation, if there are several legal forms, differentiated by their mode of production. The truly difficult problem, then, is to find out whether these difference are related to organized derogatory superiority, such that lower deficient norms can be nullified. Such structures appear more and more frequently in contemporary law. To better grasp this, we use the concept of non-equivalent polymorphism. The problem of whether courts are competent to annul lower level constitutional provisions is presently not explicitly settled in formal constitutions. It can �and should� nonetheless be solved through means of constitutional interpretation¿Pueden ser inconstitucionales algunas partes de la «Constitución»? y, en tal caso, ¿cuáles deberían ser las consecuencias? Varios tribunales han considerado estas hipótesis pero pocos han anulado artículos incluidos en la Constitución formal. Desde el ámbito académico, los debates continúan siendo muy controvertidos y parece que están pendientes explicaciones que sean convincentes a favor de una u otra solución. Este artículo aborda este rompecabezas desde dos puntos de vista: el de la teoría del Derecho y el del Derecho Constitucional comparado desde la perspectiva del normativismo analítico. Defiende la posición de que esta perspectiva permite un mejor análisis de la cuestión subyacente entendida como un problema de jerarquías complejas, y puede proporcionar soluciones a los casos presentados en ordenamientos jurídicos tan distintos como los de Austria, Francia, Alemania o Israel. Tradicionalmente, la Constitución es vista como un bloque único en la cúspide del sistema legal. Pero lo que esto significa resulta a menudo misterioso u oscuro. Si hubiera algo por encima de este elemento de la cúspide ese algo podría ser considerado desde la perspectiva moral o, en la línea de realismo jurídico, como una mera cuestión jurisprudencial. De acuerdo con la concepción aquí establecida, la pregunta de si existen diferentes niveles de normas y cuáles sean las relaciones normativas aplicables entre los mismos, es una cuestión de Derecho positivo. Por ello, puede haber varios planos por encima de lo que se suele considerar como legislación primaria, si hay varias formas legales, diferenciadas por su modo de producción. El problema verdaderamente difícil, por tanto, es encontrar si estas diferencias están relacionadas con una supremacía derogatoria organizada, de suerte que las normas inferiores deficientes puedan ser anuladas. Tales estructuras aparecen más y más frecuentemente en el Derecho contemporáneo. Para mejor captar esto, usamos el concepto de «polimorfismo no equivalente». El problema de si los tribunales son competentes para anular artículos constitucionales de un nivel inferior no está hoy en día explicitado en las Constituciones formales. Sin embargo, puede, y debe, ser resuelto por medio de la interpretación constitucionalCentro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales2013text (article)application/pdfhttp://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4560794(Revista) ISSN 0211-5743Revista española de derecho constitucional, ISSN 0211-5743, Año nº 33, Nº 99, 2013, pags. 17-60spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: http://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
|