Equilibrio de poderes, cooperación y la conformación de gobiernos de coalición en México
The paper shows how divided governments in Mexico lack of cooperation systems in formal terms. The presence of a dominant opposition blocks cooperation systems between political forces and weak the party in government, while cooperation between parties is not given under the programmatic agreement w...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Published: |
Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública, CESOP
2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4703122 |
| Source: | Revista legislativa de estudios sociales y de opinión pública, Vol. 6, Nº. 11, 2013, pags. 7-44 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
| Summary: |
The paper shows how divided governments in Mexico lack of cooperation
systems in formal terms. The presence of a dominant opposition blocks cooperation systems between political forces and weak the party
in government, while cooperation between parties is not given under the
programmatic agreement with the government, but under conditions of
electoral benefi t. Under the approach of coalition formation, the paper
presents a series of statistical results from the idea that cooperation is
not possible if there is an imbalance between the forces that compose
the Congress, to prove this it uses various index of fragmentation in the
composition of Congress, the weight of the ruling party and the opposition
weight in terms of dominance. Subsequently these data were analyzed
with the results of legislative success of political actors in terms of
production and approval of bills, to later identify the cooperation of such
approvals in terms of the possible formation of legislative coalitions. |
|---|