La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
For years, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP) was considered the main and largest armed insurgency, the number one enemy of the State. Also, since 2012, a process of dialogue and political negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP was carried...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
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2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7241974 |
| Fuente: | Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 14, Nº. 29 (Julio-Diciembre), 2019 |
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Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 14, Nº. 29 (Julio-Diciembre), 2019
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Spanish
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Guerrilla de las FARC-EP
Derrota estratégica Gobierno colombiano Fuerzas Militares de Colombia FARC-EP guerrillas Strategic defeat Colombian Government Colombian Military Forces |
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Guerrilla de las FARC-EP
Derrota estratégica Gobierno colombiano Fuerzas Militares de Colombia FARC-EP guerrillas Strategic defeat Colombian Government Colombian Military Forces Ortiz Lancheros, Carlos Alfonso La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010 |
| description |
For years, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP) was considered the main and largest armed insurgency, the number one enemy of the State. Also, since 2012, a process of dialogue and political negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP was carried out, which resulted in ending the military confrontation of more than six decades and enabling a path of reforms and democratic openness for this organization. . There are many factors that explain that the real possibility of the definitive ceasefire between the establishment and the FARC-EP has been successful. However, the strategic defeat of the first Colombian guerrillas is the least explored and with few results in the subfield of political analysis. That the guerrilla of the FARC-EP has entered a process of reinstatement is not only explained by an obvious erosion of the war or a window of opportunity for negotiated political departure, but also because on the military political level there was an unfavorable scenario that It failed to overcome. This fact is proposed to analyze based on the joint analysis approach, which recognizes a relational and strategic horizon of political-military action that includes the identification of actors, events, scenarios, correlation of forces and structure-conjuncture relationship based on the literature review of experts and the Center for Research in Military Historical Memory (CIMHM) attached to the Ministry of Defense.
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Article
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| author |
Ortiz Lancheros, Carlos Alfonso
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| author_facet |
Ortiz Lancheros, Carlos Alfonso
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| author_sort |
Ortiz Lancheros, Carlos Alfonso
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| title |
La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
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| title_short |
La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
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| title_full |
La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
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| title_fullStr |
La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
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| title_full_unstemmed |
La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010
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| title_sort |
la derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, el caso de las farc-ep - colombia 1994-2010
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| publishDate |
2019
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7241974
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1727401221667422208
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00013926732022-03-13La derrota estratégica de la insurgencia armada, El caso de las FARC-EP - Colombia 1994-2010Ortiz Lancheros, Carlos AlfonsoGuerrilla de las FARC-EPDerrota estratégicaGobierno colombianoFuerzas Militares de ColombiaFARC-EP guerrillasStrategic defeatColombian GovernmentColombian Military ForcesFor years, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARC-EP) was considered the main and largest armed insurgency, the number one enemy of the State. Also, since 2012, a process of dialogue and political negotiation between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP was carried out, which resulted in ending the military confrontation of more than six decades and enabling a path of reforms and democratic openness for this organization. . There are many factors that explain that the real possibility of the definitive ceasefire between the establishment and the FARC-EP has been successful. However, the strategic defeat of the first Colombian guerrillas is the least explored and with few results in the subfield of political analysis. That the guerrilla of the FARC-EP has entered a process of reinstatement is not only explained by an obvious erosion of the war or a window of opportunity for negotiated political departure, but also because on the military political level there was an unfavorable scenario that It failed to overcome. This fact is proposed to analyze based on the joint analysis approach, which recognizes a relational and strategic horizon of political-military action that includes the identification of actors, events, scenarios, correlation of forces and structure-conjuncture relationship based on the literature review of experts and the Center for Research in Military Historical Memory (CIMHM) attached to the Ministry of Defense.Por años se consideró a las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) como la principal y más grande insurgencia armada, enemigo número uno del Estado. Asimismo, desde 2012 se adelantó un proceso de diálogo y negociación política entre el gobierno colombiano y las FARC-EP, que tuvo como resultado poner fin a la confrontación militar de más de seis décadas y habilitar un camino de reformas y apertura democrática para esta organización. Son muchos los factores que explican que la posibilidad real del cese definitivo al fuego entre el establecimiento y las FARC-EP haya sido exitosa. Sin embargo, la derrota estratégica de la primera guerrilla colombiana es la menos explorada y de escasos resultados en el subcampo del análisis político. Que la guerrilla de las FARC-EP haya ingresado a un proceso de reincorporación no sólo se explica por un desgaste obvio de la guerra o una ventana de oportunidad a la salida política negociada, sino también porque en el plano político militar hubo un escenario desfavorable que no se logró superar. Este hecho se propone analizar con base en el enfoque de análisis de coyuntura, que reconoce un horizonte relacional y estratégico de la acción político-militar que comprende la identificación de actores, acontecimientos, escenarios, correlación de fuerzas y relación estructura-coyuntura a partir de la revisión bibliográfica de expertos y el Centro de Investigación en Memoria Histórica Militar (CIMHM) adscrito al Ministerio de Defensa.2019text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7241974(Revista) ISSN 1794-6638Revista Ratio Juris, ISSN 1794-6638, Vol. 14, Nº. 29 (Julio-Diciembre), 2019spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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