En defensa de la descripción
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.” Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden...
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| Formatua: | Artikulua |
| Hizkuntza: | Gaztelania |
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2019
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| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=7057987 |
| Baliabidea: | Revista Derecho del Estado, ISSN 0122-9893, Nº. 44, 2019, pags. 9-30 |
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| Laburpena: |
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein declared: “We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.” Michel Foucault in turn repeatedly referred to his method of study as description, arguing that the role of philosophy is not to reveal what is hidden, but rather to make us see what is seen. This essay suggests why the turn to description as a mode of legal writing might be a productive move at this time. |
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