La pena en Kant: ¿retribucionista en lo moral, pero no en lo legal?
In this article, the author holds that the Kant´s ideas en relation with the punishment can be classified in a “weak” retributive theory about legal punish. In this views about retributivism, punishment is justified in the necessity to prevents and dissuades to the citizenship to commit criminal act...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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2010
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| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6766533 |
| Source: | Estudios de derecho, ISSN 0120-1867, Vol. 67, Nº. 150, 2010, pags. 85-112 |
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| Summary: |
In this article, the author holds that the Kant´s ideas en relation with the punishment can be classified in a “weak” retributive theory about legal punish. In this views about retributivism, punishment is justified in the necessity to prevents and dissuades to the citizenship to commit criminal acts, but in the moment to imposes the punish, only the State can bear in mind for man individualization that this has (i) committed a crime, and (ii) the grade of affectation to the exterior freedom that the crime has generated. This position is argued by means of, expositions of freedom´s concepts, State and law for Kant, showing that when the Kant´s ideas are read in their integrity, it isn´t plausible to attribute to Kant a “strong” retributivism, and as well they permit to see the reasons so that those concepts can attribute a retributive theory in its weak view. In the same form is showed the differences between moral sphere and law for Kant, to show the implications that these have for his conception of the punishment, and is explicated because a “weak” retributivism doesn´t affects the autonomy and dignity of the man. |
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