O que o processo civil precisa aprender com a linguagem?
The present article aims to unveil how the Brazilian civil process is still widely compromised with the René Descartes and Wilhelm Leibniz’s rationalist philosophical paradigm, trough what Ovídio Araujo Baptista da Silva named as ordinariness. The ordinariness is nothing more than seeing the process...
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Portugués |
| Publicado: |
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=6120945 |
| Fuente: | Revista Brasileira de Direito, ISSN 2238-0604, Vol. 13, Nº. 2, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista Brasileira de Direito. Mai-Ago/2017), pags. 317-335 |
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| Sumario: |
The present article aims to unveil how the Brazilian civil process is still widely compromised with the René Descartes and Wilhelm Leibniz’s rationalist philosophical paradigm, trough what Ovídio Araujo Baptista da Silva named as ordinariness. The ordinariness is nothing more than seeing the process as a method, worth saying, as a rigid proceeding with aprioristic and timeless character that prey at producing res judicata provisions, based on the “search for the real truth” presupposition. With the Hermeneutical Critics of Law as the conducting wire of the present study, it is intended to unveil how the Cartesian thought was surpassed in (and for) the philosophy and, in this way, uncover how the ordinariness rupture in the process does not runs through a legislative rupture, but by a rupture with the jurist’s theoretical common sense, that stands compromised with the Cartesian rationalism, ignoring the ontological turn promoted by Heidegger and Gadamer. |
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