Control parlamentario y convergencia entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo
It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Castellano |
| Publicado: |
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5865509 |
| Fuente: | Teoría y realidad constitucional, ISSN 1139-5583, Nº 38, 2016, pags. 61-99 |
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| Sumario: |
It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation. |
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