On tû-tû
The goal in this short paper is to argue that so-called intermediary concepts play an essential role in organizing and generating legal knowledge. The point of departure is a reconstruction and a critique of Alf Ross’s analysis of such concepts. His goal was to argue that there exist concepts in the...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2015
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328973 |
| Source: | Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law) |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags: Be the first to tag this record
|
| id |
dialnet-ar-18-ART0000896955
|
|---|---|
| record_format |
dialnet
|
| spelling |
dialnet-ar-18-ART00008969552022-03-12On tû-tûBrozek, Bartoszintermediary conceptssemantic referencelegal knowledgecoherencecompletenessThe goal in this short paper is to argue that so-called intermediary concepts play an essential role in organizing and generating legal knowledge. The point of departure is a reconstruction and a critique of Alf Ross’s analysis of such concepts. His goal was to argue that there exist concepts in the law which have no semantic reference, yet it is reasonable to use them as they perform some useful function regarding the presentation of legal rules. The author believes that Ross is wrong on both counts: his argument to the effect that intermediary concepts have no reference is flawed, and his characterization of the functions such concepts play in the law is too limiting.2015text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328973(Revista) ISSN 1581-7652(Revista) ISSN 1855-7112Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law)engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
|
| institution |
Dialnet
|
| collection |
Dialnet AR
|
| source |
Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 27, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Emergence, Coherence, and Interpretation of Law)
|
| language |
English
|
| topic |
intermediary concepts
semantic reference legal knowledge coherence completeness |
| spellingShingle |
intermediary concepts
semantic reference legal knowledge coherence completeness Brozek, Bartosz On tû-tû |
| description |
The goal in this short paper is to argue that so-called intermediary concepts play an essential role in organizing and generating legal knowledge. The point of departure is a reconstruction and a critique of Alf Ross’s analysis of such concepts. His goal was to argue that there exist concepts in the law which have no semantic reference, yet it is reasonable to use them as they perform some useful function regarding the presentation of legal rules. The author believes that Ross is wrong on both counts: his argument to the effect that intermediary concepts have no reference is flawed, and his characterization of the functions such concepts play in the law is too limiting.
|
| format |
Article
|
| author |
Brozek, Bartosz
|
| author_facet |
Brozek, Bartosz
|
| author_sort |
Brozek, Bartosz
|
| title |
On tû-tû
|
| title_short |
On tû-tû
|
| title_full |
On tû-tû
|
| title_fullStr |
On tû-tû
|
| title_full_unstemmed |
On tû-tû
|
| title_sort |
on tû-tû
|
| publishDate |
2015
|
| url |
https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328973
|
| _version_ |
1727220310676078592
|