Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
The paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analys...
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Source: | Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 26, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Positivism, Conceptual Jurisprudence, and Attribution of Responsibility) |
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dialnet-ar-18-ART00008969462022-03-12Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio BobbioRuiz Manero, Juanmethodologytheorylegal ideologyNorberto Bobbiolegal positivismThe paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analysis of the concepts of basic norm and rule of recognition, he demonstrates how Bobbio's later rejection of these two concepts implies acceptance of positivistic legal theory and ideology – despite the fact that he explicitly rejected them in the first place. The reason for this Bobbio's slip is found in his absorbtion in the positivist legal culture which is permeated with the internal point of view on the law. The author suggests rejecting Bobbio's tripartite disctinction of legal positivism and proposes instead to view this as a set of seldom indvisible standpoints forming a specific legal culture.2015text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328964(Revista) ISSN 1581-7652(Revista) ISSN 1855-7112Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 26, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Positivism, Conceptual Jurisprudence, and Attribution of Responsibility)spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI
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Revus: Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, ISSN 1855-7112, Nº. 26, 2015 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Positivism, Conceptual Jurisprudence, and Attribution of Responsibility)
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methodology
theory legal ideology Norberto Bobbio legal positivism |
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theory legal ideology Norberto Bobbio legal positivism Ruiz Manero, Juan Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio |
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The paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analysis of the concepts of basic norm and rule of recognition, he demonstrates how Bobbio's later rejection of these two concepts implies acceptance of positivistic legal theory and ideology – despite the fact that he explicitly rejected them in the first place. The reason for this Bobbio's slip is found in his absorbtion in the positivist legal culture which is permeated with the internal point of view on the law. The author suggests rejecting Bobbio's tripartite disctinction of legal positivism and proposes instead to view this as a set of seldom indvisible standpoints forming a specific legal culture.
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format |
Article
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author |
Ruiz Manero, Juan
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author_facet |
Ruiz Manero, Juan
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author_sort |
Ruiz Manero, Juan
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title |
Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
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title_short |
Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
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title_full |
Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
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title_fullStr |
Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
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title_full_unstemmed |
Bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio Bobbio
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title_sort |
bobbio y el positivismo: la triple distinción y el propio bobbio
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publishDate |
2015
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https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5328964
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1727220310084681728
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