Breves reflexões sobre o pluralismo jurídico como paradigma fundamental do direito contemporâneo nas sociedades ocidentais altamente diferenciadas
Many scholars, from different disciplines, use the category of “legal pluralism” to explain the legal dimension of Western societies’ increasing cultural, religious and social differentiation. As a particularly complex concept, the notion of “legal pluralism” requires to be deeply investigated in or...
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Idioma: | Portugués |
| Publicado: |
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=5120187 |
| Fuente: | Revista Brasileira de Direito, ISSN 2238-0604, Vol. 10, Nº. 2, 2014 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista Brasileira de Direito - Dez/14), pags. 74-84 |
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| Sumario: |
Many scholars, from different disciplines, use the category of “legal pluralism” to explain the legal dimension of Western societies’ increasing cultural, religious and social differentiation. As a particularly complex concept, the notion of “legal pluralism” requires to be deeply investigated in order to better understand its many implications and increase its explanatory potential as a paradigm for understanding the legal complexity of highly diversified societies. In this regard, the contribution of Italian legal scholarship offers precious inspiration. On the one hand, Santi Romano – a legal thinker active in the first half of the 20th century –can be considered one of the founding fathers of legal pluralism: with his masterpiece L’ordinamento giuridico (1918), he delved into the issue of legal pluralism from an anti-formalist perspective, in opposition to legal positivism. On the other hand, the works of Paolo Grossi – a distinguished historian of law who addressed legal pluralism as a characteristic of law in the Middle Ages – are also very important for the study of law in contemporary Europe, since he criticizes the dominant legal reductionism and promotes the objective dimension of law as a social institution. |
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