Whither Contract Damages: Contracts with Bilateral Reliance, One-sided Private Information

This article explores the canonical contracting problem in a general set up of bilateral "selfish" reliance with post contractual one-sided asymmetric information, helping uncover the shape optimal contracts and the optimal damage remedies. The quantity choice of the traded commodity is in...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bag, Sugata
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Pontificia Universidad Javierana 2010
Subjects:
Contract Law
Contract Breach
Incomplete Contracts
Moral Hazards
Mechanism Design
Damages
Asymmetric Information
derecho de los contratos
incumplimiento del contrato
contratos incompletos
riesgo moral
diseño de mecanismos
daños y perjuicios
información asimétrica
droit des contrats
non-respect du contrat
contrats incomplets
risque moral
conception de mécanismes
dommages et préjudices
information asymétrique
Online Access:http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4690870
Source:Revista de la Maestria en Derecho Económico, ISSN 1692-3103, Nº. 6, 2010, pags. 17-51
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Whither Contract Damages: Contracts with Bilateral Reliance, One-sided Private Information
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