Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

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dialnet-ar-18-ART00005144942019-02-19Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente ÚltimaRuiz Manero, JuanBobbioKelsenHartNorma básicaRegla de reconoci mientoBobbioKelsenHartBasic normRule of recognitionThroughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen�s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart�s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author�s view, Bobbio�s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm.A lo largo de su extensísima obra, Bobbio se ha ocupado en repetidas ocasiones de las dos principales versiones del concepto de norma jurídicamente última: el concepto de norma básica o fundamental de Kelsen y el concepto de regla de reconocimiento de Hart. Tanto en relación con el concepto de norma básica como en relación con el concepto de regla de reconocimiento Bobbio ha defendido �en unos textos� que se trataba de conceptos imprescindibles y también �en textos posteriores� que se trataba de conceptos no sólo innecesarios sino inconvenientes, de conceptos de cuya eliminación se beneficiaría la teoría del derecho resultante. A juicio del autor, la teoría del derecho necesita integrar un concepto de norma jurídicamente última. Y, también a juicio del autor, las propuestas bobbianas de abandonar las dos principales versiones de este concepto van acompañadas y resultan inseparables de interpretaciones de una y otra que resultan claramente desencaminadas en el caso del concepto de regla de reconocimiento y por diversas razones no aceptables en el caso del concepto de norma básica.Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)2012text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4065118(Revista) ISSN 2177-7055Seqüência: estudos jurídicos e políticos, ISSN 2177-7055, Vol. 33, Nº. 64, 2012, pags. 39-56spaLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI

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Seqüência: estudos jurídicos e políticos, ISSN 2177-7055, Vol. 33, Nº. 64, 2012, pags. 39-56

Spanish

Bobbio
Kelsen
Hart
Norma básica
Regla de reconoci miento
Bobbio
Kelsen
Hart
Basic norm
Rule of recognition

Bobbio
Kelsen
Hart
Norma básica
Regla de reconoci miento
Bobbio
Kelsen
Hart
Basic norm
Rule of recognition
Ruiz Manero, Juan
Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

Throughout his very extensive work, Bobbio has repeatedly dealt with the two main versions of the concept of a legally ultimate norm: Kelsen�s concept of the basic or fundamental norm and the Hart�s concept of the rule of recognition. In relation to the concept of the basic norm as in relation to the concept of the rule of recognition, Bobbio has argued in some texts that they are absolutely necessary concepts and, in later texts, that these concepts are not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, that they are concepts whose elimination would benefit the resulting theory of law. For the author, legal theory needs to integrate a concept of a legally ultimate norm. Moreover, in the author�s view, Bobbio�s propos als to abandon the two main versions of this concept are accompanied by and are inseparable from interpretations which deal with them in a clearly misguided way in the case of the concept of rule of recognition and which are for various reasons not acceptable in the case of the concept of basic norm.

Article

Ruiz Manero, Juan

Ruiz Manero, Juan

Ruiz Manero, Juan

Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

Bobbio y los Conceptos de Norma Jurídicamente Última

bobbio y los conceptos de norma jurídicamente última

Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)

2012

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=4065118

1709710820409081856