La investigación de los crímenes cometidos en la guerra civil y el franquismo como delito de prevaricación
In this article we will raise a number of legal considerations, in accordance with the applicable international law, in order to refute the arguments put forward in the decision of the Supreme Court of 3 February 2010 that support the charge for breach of legal duty against Judge Baltasar Garzón. In...
Gorde:
| Egile Nagusiak: | , |
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| Formatua: | Artikulua |
| Hizkuntza: | Gaztelania |
| Argitaratua: |
Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales
2010
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| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=3427376 |
| Baliabidea: | Revista electrónica de estudios internacionales, ISSN 1697-5197, Nº. 19, 2010 |
| Etiketak: |
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| Laburpena: |
In this article we will raise a number of legal considerations, in accordance with the applicable
international law, in order to refute the arguments put forward in the decision of the Supreme Court of 3
February 2010 that support the charge for breach of legal duty against Judge Baltasar Garzón. In particular,
we will explain how a correct interpretation of Law 52/2007, the right to an effective remedy, the right to
access to justice, the Amnesty Law of 1977, as well as a correct understanding of the concept of crimes
against humanity, including enforced disappearances, as per international law, cannot sustain such charges. |
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