Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

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dialnet-ar-18-ART00003769202022-08-03Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to languageSterling Casas, Juan PabloWittgensteinDerechoLenguajeInterpretaciónHermenéuticaFilosofía del derechoWittgensteinLawLanguageInterpretationHermeneuticsLaw PhilosophyThe importance of Wittgenstein’s thought lies on the idea that he proposes a revelation of truth from a kind of skepticism that leads to a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the situations of life through the study of language. For this reason, studying Law, see it as a phenomenon of language is an enriching opportunity. Among other issues, the analysis of language that Wittgenstein makes involves the removal of a narrative “mysterious” and endowed with a heartiness and disturbing emotion, something like a “pure theory of language”, to paraphrase Kelsen, that means a theory that accounts of language phenomena for understanding the structures of thought from “seeing” and “hear” without interpretation or mysteries. Wittgenstein’s theory, so conceived, appears to reinforce the idea of a need to interpret, but in turn leads to the requirement of a rigorous hermeneutics, from the analytical point of view, delete the fallacies and mysteries of ambiguous language.La importancia del pensamiento de Wittgenstein radica en que propone una revelación de verdades a partir de una especie de escepticismo que conlleva a un análisis global y sistemático de las situaciones de la vida a través del estudio del lenguaje. Por esta razón, estudiar el derecho a partir de concebirlo como un fenómeno del lenguaje es una posibilidad enriquecedora. Entre otras cuestiones, el análisis del lenguaje que realiza Wittgenstein supone la eliminación de una narrativa “misteriosa” y dotada de una efusividad y emotividad perturbadora, algo así como una “teoría pura del lenguaje” -parafraseando a Kelsen-; es decir, una teoría que permita explicar fenómenos del lenguaje para entender las estructuras del pensamiento a partir del “ver” y el “oír” sin interpretaciones ni misterios. La teoría de Wittgenstein, así concebida, parece reforzar la idea de una necesidad de interpretar, pero a su vez conlleva la exigencia de una hermenéutica rigurosa que, desde el punto de vista analítico, elimine las falacias y misterios de un lenguaje ambiguo.Universidad de Manizales (UManizales): Centro de Investigaciones Socio-Jurídicas de la Facultad de Derecho2010text (article)application/pdfhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=3343289(Revista) ISSN 0123-9465Ambiente Jurídico, ISSN 0123-9465, Nº. 12, 2010, pags. 206-228engLICENCIA DE USO: Los documentos a texto completo incluidos en Dialnet son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de estos documentos deberá hacerse a través de la URL oficial de éstos en Dialnet. Más información: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS STATEMENT: Full text documents hosted by Dialnet are protected by copyright and/or related rights. This digital object is accessible without charge, but its use is subject to the licensing conditions set by its authors or editors. Unless expressly stated otherwise in the licensing conditions, you are free to linking, browsing, printing and making a copy for your own personal purposes. All other acts of reproduction and communication to the public are subject to the licensing conditions expressed by editors and authors and require consent from them. Any link to this document should be made using its official URL in Dialnet. More info: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/info/derechosOAI

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Ambiente Jurídico, ISSN 0123-9465, Nº. 12, 2010, pags. 206-228

English

Wittgenstein
Derecho
Lenguaje
Interpretación
Hermenéutica
Filosofía del derecho
Wittgenstein
Law
Language
Interpretation
Hermeneutics
Law Philosophy

Wittgenstein
Derecho
Lenguaje
Interpretación
Hermenéutica
Filosofía del derecho
Wittgenstein
Law
Language
Interpretation
Hermeneutics
Law Philosophy
Sterling Casas, Juan Pablo
Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

The importance of Wittgenstein’s thought lies on the idea that he proposes a revelation of truth from a kind of skepticism that leads to a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the situations of life through the study of language. For this reason, studying Law, see it as a phenomenon of language is an enriching opportunity. Among other issues, the analysis of language that Wittgenstein makes involves the removal of a narrative “mysterious” and endowed with a heartiness and disturbing emotion, something like a “pure theory of language”, to paraphrase Kelsen, that means a theory that accounts of language phenomena for understanding the structures of thought from “seeing” and “hear” without interpretation or mysteries. Wittgenstein’s theory, so conceived, appears to reinforce the idea of a need to interpret, but in turn leads to the requirement of a rigorous hermeneutics, from the analytical point of view, delete the fallacies and mysteries of ambiguous language.

Article

Sterling Casas, Juan Pablo

Sterling Casas, Juan Pablo

Sterling Casas, Juan Pablo

Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

Wittgenstein and the law: Toward a claim for correction to language

wittgenstein and the law: toward a claim for correction to language

Universidad de Manizales (UManizales): Centro de Investigaciones Socio-Jurídicas de la Facultad de Derecho

2010

https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/oaiart?codigo=3343289

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